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INTRODUCTION:  THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE AND HUMAN MIGRATION 
Since before the dawn of recorded history, human civilizations have 
been built, destroyed, and reshaped by the ceaseless movement of peoples 
from one place to another over the course of decades and centuries.  Like 
the advance and retreat of glaciers, and the clash of tectonic plates, the 
human urge to migrate is a force that civilizations may hope to understand 
and partially mitigate, but can never abolish or control.  
The United States as a nation owes its existence to the inexorability of 
this urge.  Five hundred years of forced and voluntary migration have made 
this country what it is.  The American law of immigration can best be 
viewed as a partial response to the implacable pressure of migration.  
American immigration laws are not aimed at, and only very remotely 
shape, this long-term historical force.  Constitutional and legal norms may 
influence how migration affects our society in the present, but they do not 
create the force of migration and, no matter how altered, cannot abolish it.  
To focus immigration policy on somehow doing away with migration is 
likely to prove as futile as would be a climate policy based on outlawing 
the retreat of the Arctic icecap.   
Nonetheless, current policy debate on immigration is influenced by the 
illusion that we can somehow defuse the surge of immigration.  So it 
should hardly be surprising that at a time like this, we are experiencing an 
upsurge of interest in the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which is the central engine of the legal assimilation of new immigrant 
populations into the United States. 
Because of the Citizenship Clause, ―all persons born . . . in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof‖ are American citizens.  In the 
case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark,1 the United States Supreme Court 
held that this guarantee applies to children of foreigners present on 
American soil, even if their parents are not American citizens and indeed 
are not eligible to become U.S. citizens.2  The Court has not re-examined 
                                                 
 1. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 2. Id. at 705. 
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this issue since the concept of ―illegal alien‖ entered the language,3 but as a 
practical matter, the American-born children receive recognition of their 
citizenship regardless of the immigration status of their parents.4  
As a matter of text, this result is straightforward.  A child of illegal 
aliens, if ―born‖ in the United States, is in a commonsense way surely at 
the moment of birth ―subject to the jurisdiction‖ of the United States.  Any 
power the law has over children of American citizens at the moment of 
their birth on American soil, it also has over American-born children of 
aliens, regardless of the parents‘ immigration status. Such a child may be, 
for example, taken into custody as part of a child abuse investigation, 
detained indefinitely, placed in foster care, and made adoptable by an 
appropriate action to strip her parents of parental rights.5  Any assets 
belonging to her, if made subject the subject of a civil dispute, are subject 
to attachment by the courts under the proper circumstances.  The criminal 
justice system has as much access to her as it does to any child of citizen 
parents.   
This seemingly straightforward application of constitutional text is now 
under attack.  One strand of the attack arises out of simple  
(and, it must be said, ugly) nativist anger at the impact of immigrants, legal 
or otherwise, on society.  In August 2006, the television news commentator 
Lou Dobbs ―polled‖ the viewers of his Cable News Network show with the 
following question:  ―Do you believe illegal aliens who have anchor babies 
in the United States should be immune from deportation?‖6  Ninety-three 
percent of those responding, he reported, voted ―no.‖7  Recently, Senator 
                                                 
 3. The term ―illegal alien‖ pops up in the federal reports in 1950.  See Waisbord v. 
United States, 183 F.2d 34, 35 (5th Cir. 1950).  ―Illegal immigrant‖ first appears in United 
States caselaw in 1954, but in a context that refers to British attempts to stop the flow of 
Jewish refugees to Palestine.  Derecktor v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 136, 139 (Ct. Cl. 
1954).  As a term from United States immigration law, it enters the caselaw in 1957, when 
the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal by a defendant of his conviction for assaulting an 
immigration officer who, having been informed that illegal entrants from Mexico were 
present in a Pico, California, bar, had entered the bar and begun asking customers for their 
place of birth.  Amaya v. United States,  
247 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1957).  The court stated that ―[s]triving to stem the swelling tide 
of ‗wetbacks‘—illegal immigrants from Mexico—that is sweeping into the United States, 
for years American immigration authorities have progressively tightened their vigilance 
over the ramparts they watch.‖  Id. at 947.  
 4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006) (codifying birthright citizenship in the United States).  
 5. See In re Adoption of Peggy, 767 N.E.2d 29, 32, 35–36 (Mass. 2002) (holding that 
the immigration status of a child has no effect on the authority of the state‘s child protection 
agency to exercise jurisdiction over the child); S. Adam Ferguson, Not Without My 
Daughter:  Deportation and the Termination of Parental Rights,  
22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 89 (2007) (―Federal immigration law specifically recognizes state 
jurisdiction over custody determinations of children who have been abused or neglected, 
regardless of the child‘s immigration status.‖).  
 6. Ken Auletta, Mad As Hell, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 4, 2006, at 72. 
 7. Id.  Note the intricate manipulativeness of the question.  To begin with, it implies 
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Lindsey Graham denounced aliens who, like livestock, ―come here to drop 
a child. It‘s called ‗drop and leave.‘‖8 
But, another strand is far more respectable intellectually.  This is a legal 
argument that the interpretation of the Citizenship Clause as covering the 
children of ―illegal‖ immigrants is inconsistent with the ―original intent‖ of 
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This claim is obviously of vast 
practical consequence.  If the Clause is not peremptory in its meaning, then 
Congress could vote to withhold citizenship from native-born children 
based on their parents‘ immigration status—which, if upheld by the courts, 
would quickly produce a large population of native non-citizens (possibly 
stateless as well) within our borders.9 
Beyond that practical importance, however, the argument is  
an interesting opportunity to review the nature of ―originalism‖  
as a method of constitutional interpretation.  Originalism is often advanced 
as a methodology that holds promise for clarifying unclear portions of 
constitutional text or for filling lacunae in the document.  That is not the 
use to which it is being put in the context of the Citizenship Clause.  Here, 
the originalist claim is in essence that seemingly clear words mean 
something other than what they say; that the language was adopted with 
mental reservation or qualification that should prevent our giving them 
their plain meaning.  In essence, the claim is that the Framers did not really 
mean what they said.  They could not have.   
The intellectual framework of this critique of the current law derives 
from Citizenship Without Consent by Peter Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, a 
book that outlines two conceptions of citizenship, ―ascriptive‖ and 
―consensual.‖10  In this analysis, citizenship that attaches by birth raises 
questions of legitimacy, for it involves no act of assent by the new citizen, 
and (if the citizen is born to a citizen of a different country) by her parents 
either.  This concept is seen as medieval in origin and as contravening the 
                                                 
the existence of a non-existent legal norm; ―illegal aliens‖ who have American-born 
children are not ―immune from deportation,‖ though they may plead the hardship to their 
citizen children of deportation.  Second, by verbal legerdemain it transforms human beings, 
innocent of crime, into objects made of lead, whose only significance is their utility in the 
offenses of lawbreakers.  What would have been the result had the question been worded, 
―Should the United States government punish American citizens for the crimes of their 
parents?‖ 
 8. Andy Barr, Graham Eyes ―Birthright Citizenship‖, POLITICO, July 29, 2010, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/40395.html. 
 9. The obsolete term for a ―person whose status is midway between being  
an alien and a natural-born or naturalized subject‖ is ―denizen.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 
499 (9th ed. 2009). 
 10. PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:  ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 4 (1985). 
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trend of contemporary political theory about citizenship.11  Advocates of 
abolishing or modifying birthright citizenship note also that many 
contemporary nations do not provide it, suggesting by implication that the 
Clause is an antiquated remnant of a former time without relevance to 
present demographic issues.12 
Schuck and Smith‘s argument has been elaborated and refined into a 
legal argument, most prominently by one of the pioneers of contemporary 
―originalism,‖ former United States Attorney General Edwin L. Meese, 
who helped coin the term during the 1980s.   
In 2004, Meese, as amicus curiae, submitted a brief in the case of Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld,13 which turned on the issue of whether the United States Armed 
Forces could detain Yasser Esam Hamdi as an ―enemy combatant‖ without 
affording him the procedures specified by the Constitution.14  The Meese 
brief argued that the Court should moot the issue by holding that Hamdi, 
the child of two Saudi citizens temporarily resident in the United States, 
was not a United States citizen within the proper interpretation of the 
Citizenship Clause.15  This claim is all the more constitutionally remarkable 
because Hamdi‘s parents, though aliens, were legal residents of Louisiana 
at the time of his birth, present on temporary visas.16 
Counsel of record for the Meese Brief was Dean John C. Eastman of 
Chapman University.17  The brief argued that ―the clear intent of the 
Framers who adopted and the people who ratified‖ the Citizenship Clause 
                                                 
 11. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 12 (―English law assumed from antiquity 
that all persons born within the dominions of the Crown . . . were English subjects.‖). 
 12. In the general debate on immigration policy, the originalist arguments for judicial or 
legislative re-interpretation of the Clause co-exist with a set of policy-based arguments that 
suggest that, regardless of the text or ―intent‖ of the Clause, birthright citizenship is an 
antiquated and dangerous policy that should be revoked even if doing so requires 
amendment of the Clause by use of the Article V process.  This argument was first 
prominently advanced by then-Governor Pete Wilson of California, who advocated 
restrictions of the rights of ―illegal aliens‖ and non-recognition of their native-born children 
as citizens during his second term as governor and as a candidate for the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1996.  See Natalie Smith, Developments in the Legislative 
Branch:  Bill Challenges Birthright Citizenship, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 325, 325 (2006) 
(summarizing legislative efforts to declare native-born children of ―illegal aliens‖ non-
citizens).  Legislation by which Congress would declare children of ―illegal aliens‖ no 
longer entitled to citizenship was introduced in 1997 and has re-emerged repeatedly since 
then. 
 13. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 14. Id. at 509; Brief for The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence 
as Amicus Curia Supporting Respondents, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507  
(No. 03-6696) [hereinafter Claremont Amicus Brief]. 
 15. Claremont Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at *5 (―Mere birth to foreign nationals who 
happen to be visiting the United States at the time, as was the case of Hamdi, is not 
sufficient for constitutionally-compelled citizenship.‖). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at *20. 
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―should prevail‖18 and that that ―clear intent‖ of those authoritative Framers 
and ratifiers was ―that only a complete jurisdiction, of the kind that brings 
with it a total and exclusive allegiance, is sufficient to qualify for the grant 
of citizenship to which the people of the United States actually consented 
when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.‖19 
The Court neither adopted nor addressed the arguments of the brief.20  
Dean Eastman, however, argues that the brief scored a victory because 
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent for himself and Justice Stevens, begins his 
separate opinion in Hamdi by calling the petitioner only a ―presumed‖ 
citizen of the United States.21 
Citizenship Without Consent has been subject to a good deal of scholarly 
criticism.22  Professor Gerald Neuman, in a review of the book at the time 
of publication, wrote that the authors ―seek to replace the constitutional 
language with a meaning that they discern in the legislative history.‖23  But 
the book has been highly influential, and many other scholars and thinkers 
have echoed its reasoning.  Charles Wood, former counsel to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee‘s Subcommittee on Immigration, has proposed that 
Congress bar ―illegal‖ aliens from the census count and, by statute, bar 
their native-born children from citizenship.24  Relying on Schuck and 
Smith, among other sources, he reads the inclusive language of the Clause 
as in fact exclusive:  ―The clause certainly provides that some persons born 
                                                 
 18. Id. at *i. 
 19. Id. at *16. 
 20. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 523 (2004) (plurality opinion) (―Justice 
Scalia largely ignores the context of this case:  a United States citizen captured in a foreign 
combat zone.‖). 
 21. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For Dean Eastman‘s claim of partial victory in 
Justice Scalia‘s choice of words, see Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the 
Meaning of Sovereignty:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, 
and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 61 (2005) (prepared statement of 
John C. Eastman, Professor, Chapman University School of Law) (stating that Justice Scalia 
―declined to accept that Hamdi was actually a citizen‖).  Dean Eastman is speaking loosely 
here:  Justice Scalia did not decline to accept anything.  The statement, ―I presume he is a 
citizen‖ is quite different from ―I decline to accept that he is a citizen.‖ (Imagine the 
difference in tone if Henry Morton Stanley had strode out of the jungle and said, ―I decline 
to accept that you are Dr. Livingstone.‖). 
 22. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Book Review:  Back to Dred Scott? 24 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 485, 496 (1987) (noting that Schuck and Smith‘s ―reading of the phrase ‗subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof‘ cannot be seriously defended as an exercise in interpretation of the 
constitutional text.‖). 
 23. Id. at 24; see also Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the 
United States to Illegal Alien Parents:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and 
Claims and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. 104 (1995) (statement of Gerald L. Neuman, Professor, Columbia University Law 
School) (describing Schuck and Smith‘s revisionist theory of the citizenship clause as 
―poorly reasoned,‖ ―historically inaccurate,‖ and ―completely circular‖). 
 24. Charles Wood, Losing Control of America‘s Future—The Census, Birthright 
Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 465, 466–68 (1999). 
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in the United States are not citizens, namely those who at birth are not 
‗subject to‘ the jurisdiction of the United States.‖25   
The estimable William Mayton has argued that ―the historically 
unimagined fact of the huge number, perhaps twelve million or more, of 
persons unlawfully within the United States has stressed our 
understandings of birthright citizenship.‖26  Birthright citizenship, Mayton 
argues, cannot be a correct reading of the Clause, because 
 [a]t times jus soli now makes no sense at all. . . . [j]us soli can be unfair 
to those made a citizen by it.  Citizenship carries with it burdens, such as 
loyalty, military service, and taxation, that are surely undue when 
imposed on a person of a relation to a nation no greater than a 
happenstance of birth on its soil.
27
 
                                                 
 25. Id. at 503.  As a matter of logic, this interpretation is invalid.  To say ―if X then Y‖ 
does not mean that there exists a class of not-X that is not Y.  ―All people in this room are 
human beings‖ is not equivalent to ―there are some people not in this room who are not 
human beings.‖   
 26. William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22  
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 224 (2008). 
 27. Id. at 223.  One answer to the ―why?‖ question is that ―the Constitution says they 
are.‖  The argument then becomes, ―Why should the Constitution say that?‖  That perhaps is 
a valid center of argument.  However, even if the next step is, ―The Constitution shouldn‘t 
say that,‖ the valid conclusion is not, ―therefore the Constitution doesn‘t really say that.‖  As 
for the burdens that voiding birthright citizenship will supposedly lift from the shoulders of 
native-born children, as long as they remain resident in the United States, legally or 
otherwise, they in fact are subject to taxation.  As for military service, there is currently no 
conscription in the United States.  However, the government has issued this warning: 
 
ATTENTION, UNDOCUMENTED MALES & IMMIGRANT SERVICING GROUPS! 
 . . . . 
If you are a man ages 18 through 25 and living in the U.S., then you 
must register with Selective Service.  It‘s the law.  
You can register at any U.S. Post Office and do not need a social 
security number.  When you do obtain a social security number, let 
Selective Service know.  Provide a copy of your new social security 
number card; being sure to include your complete name, date of birth, 
Selective Service registration number, and current mailing address; and 
mail to the Selective Service System, P.O. Box 94636, Palatine, IL 
60094-4636.  
 
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, http://www.sss.gov (last visited Sept. 24, 2010).  The argument 
that birthright citizenship is unfair has no bearing on whether it reflects the Framers‘ intent.  
Many constitutional provisions (e.g., Article I‘s provision for equal representation in the 
Senate) are arguably unfair, but they are no less binding.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 
(amended 1913).  In a larger sense, the unfairness argument proves too much.  If the 
burdens and benefits of birthright citizenship are unprincipled when given to children of 
undocumented aliens, then they are just as unfair when showered upon the children of 
citizens and lawful residents.  Professor Ayelet Shachar has recently written a penetrating 
study of this unfairness, comparing inherited citizenship to inequitable laws of property.  
See generally AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY:  CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL 
INEQUALITY (2009).  As she notes, ―[t]he children of well-off polities have done nothing to 
merit more opportunities in life than the children of poorer nations, yet the current 
property/membership system grants the former ample privileges without imposing any 
GARRETT EPPS 60.2 
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Mayton draws heavily on Schuck and Smith to argue that  
 birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment entails the gauge 
classically identified by Emer de Vattel.  This gauge is the ―moral 
relation of the parents to the state.‖  By this relation, the strands of 
commitment and contribution essential to the democratic community are 
strengthened.  This relation includes fairness . . . .
28
  
For this reason, Mayton argues that citizenship should not be decided by 
courts as a matter of constitutional right, but under the plenary control of 
Congress.29  
Of all these legal and scholarly stirrings, most significant in a practical 
sense, perhaps, is the fact that Judge Richard Posner has all but invited a 
lawsuit before his court that would offer him a chance to hack birthright 
citizenship out of the Fourteenth Amendment.30  Such a lawsuit may soon 
arise in another circuit.  The sponsor of Arizona‘s Senate Bill 1070, which 
attempted stepped-up enforcement against and exclusion of undocumented 
aliens,31 has now announced plans to introduce an even more punitive bill 
                                                 
corresponding obligations upon them to break down the concentration of wealth, security, 
and freedom that they have done nothing to earn.‖  Id. at 91.  I have not heard any of the 
advocates of a restrictive reading of the Citizenship Clause call for stripping citizenship 
from the children of citizens.  Neither set of children, however, has done anything to merit 
citizenship.  Similarly, neither has done anything to forfeit it.  Those who advocate treating 
them radically differently on the basis of their parents‘ estate in life, I think, should bear the 
burden of explaining why.  
 28. Mayton, supra note 26, at 224–25. 
 29. See id. at 225 (contending that although the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant 
birthright citizenship to persons here illegally, Congress maintains the authority to grant 
birthright citizenship to these persons). 
 30. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., 
concurring).  Posner took the random opportunity of a challenge to the deportation of the 
alien mother of two natural-born children (in which there was no issue whatsoever about the 
citizenship of the children) to opine that really none of these people should be citizens at all: 
Congress should rethink . . . awarding citizenship to everyone born in the United 
States (with a few very minor exceptions, such as the children of accredited foreign 
diplomats and of foreign heads of state on official visits to the U.S.), including the 
children of illegal immigrants whose sole motive in immigrating was to confer U.S. 
citizenship on their as yet unborn children.  This rule, though thought by some 
compelled by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . makes no sense. . . .  
. . . A constitutional amendment may be required to change the rule whereby birth 
in this country automatically confers U.S. citizenship, but I doubt it. . . . The 
purpose of the rule was to grant citizenship to the recently freed slaves, and the 
exception for children of foreign diplomats and heads of state shows that Congress 
does not read the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment literally.  
Congress would not be flouting the Constitution if it amended the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to put an end to the nonsense.  On May 5, 2003, H.R. 1567, a bill 
―To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny citizenship at birth to 
children born in the United States of parents who are not citizens or permanent 
resident aliens,‖ was referred to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 
Security, and Claims.  I hope it passes. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 31. See 2010 ARIZ. SESS. LAWS 113.  S.B. 1070 has been enjoined by the United States 
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that would attempt to strip American-born children of these aliens of their 
American citizenship.32  
This Article considers the meaning of the Citizenship Clause as a matter 
of constitutional history on the one hand and constitutional policy on the 
other.  I recently published a book-length study of the legislative framing of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.33  During the research and writing of the book, 
I was struck by the detail and sophistication of the congressional debate 
about immigration issues that accompanied passage of the Amendment.  I 
have drawn on that research to assemble a picture of the ―legislative 
history‖ of the Clause.  My reading of this material impels me to a sharply 
different conclusion than that reached by advocates of a restrictive reading.   
In my view, the history of the Amendment‘s framing lends no support to 
the idea that native-born American children should be divided into citizen 
and non-citizen classes depending on the immigration status of their 
parents. 
I do not claim to have divined the ―original intent‖ of the Framers of the 
Amendment as to this issue, which was one that was not precisely present 
in the law in 1866, the year of the framing.   
We simply cannot know how members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress would 
have responded to Lou Dobbs‘s question.  We can, however, investigate 
some things.  First, and most readily accessible, is what the Framers said as 
they debated the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Second is the 
intellectual and political background upon which they drew in the writing 
of the Amendment.  Finally, we can understand the overall situation that 
gave rise to the Amendment—what recent events had occurred and what 
overall social concerns they sparked. 
We can examine the intellectual history of nineteenth century anti-
slavery thought for concepts relevant to the debates over immigration and 
                                                 
District Court for the District of Arizona pending a trial on the issue of whether it usurps 
federal authority over immigration.  United States v. Arizona,  
703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 32. Adam Klawonn, Arizona‘s Next Immigration Target:  Children of Illegals, TIME, 
June 11, 2010, available at  
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1996064,00.html. 
 33. GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN:  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY 
REBORN]; see also Garrett Epps, Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment:  Two Don‘ts and 
Three Dos, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 433 (2007) [hereinafter Don‘ts and Dos]; Garrett 
Epps, Lecture,  Second Founding:  The Story of the Fourteenth Amendment,  
85 OR. L. REV. 895 (2006) [hereinafter Second Founding]; Garrett Epps, The Antebellum 
Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 
(2004) [hereinafter Antebellum Political Background]; Garrett Epps, The Undiscovered 
Country:  Northern Views of the Defeated South and the Political Background of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 411 (2004) [hereinafter 
Undiscovered Country]. 
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its proper role in our society, and we can take notice of what the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment said when the issue of immigration came 
before them.  In so doing, it seems to me, we need not shoulder the burden 
of ―demonstrating‖ that the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, if conjured 
before us,34 would say, ―Of course we meant that.‖  In the particular area in 
which we are working, we are faced with a claim by Dean Eastman and 
others that they have already communed with the dead, that an unclear 
reading was the Framers‘ ―clear intent.‖  The question in the first instance 
is not what the ―original intent‖ was, but rather whether those who make 
―originalist‖ claims to have deduced it have borne their burden of proof. 
As for the policy-based arguments, past history cannot provide 
determinate answers to present policy puzzles.  However, we may be able 
to glean suggestions about desirable policies today from a  
study of failed and successful policies past.  That the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s text evinces an intent to alter citizenship policy is evidence.  
The historical background of its writing may provide us with evidence of 
what constitutional flaw the Framers were addressing, and thus warn us not 
to repeat the mistakes that they felt impelled to fix.   
In Part I of this Article, I provide a brief summary of the conclusions I 
reached during my study of the framing of the Amendment about the 
overall significance of the Amendment in the political and constitutional 
dispute that framed the Civil War and Reconstruction.  I then summarize 
the ―originalist‖ argument for a restrictive reading of the Clause.  Part II 
offers my analysis of the actual legislative record of the framing of the 
Clause.  Part III provides a brief summary of the citizenship status of 
American Indians in 1866, because that status formed an important part of 
the debate over the proper scope of the Clause.  Part IV offers a look at the 
ideas of citizenship that arose out of the anti-slavery struggle and that 
formed the intellectual background of the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Part V compares the situation those Framers faced with the 
immigration situation we face today.  In my Conclusion, I examine the 
―constitutional policy‖ underlying the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole 
and suggest that birthright citizenship fits far better into the most plausible 
policies we can derive from the text and history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
I argue that the advocates for penalizing native-born children on the basis 
of their parents‘ immigration status would drive a major hole through the 
important protections offered the American people by the Fourteenth 
                                                 
 34. See generally Garrett Epps, Of Constitutional Séances and Color-Blind Ghosts,  
72 N.C. L. REV. 401, 408 (1994). 
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Amendment.  The mistake thus made would not be a novel error, but 
precisely the same mistake that was made at Philadelphia in 1787 and 
subsequently, as the antebellum order was constructed around legalized 
inequality and subordination of African Americans.  The advocates of 
creating a new non-citizen status for native-born children, I argue, are in 
danger of (inadvertently) creating a modern analogue of the post-slavery 
subordination that was occurring during the months before the framing of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Framers of the Amendment had 
present in their minds as they constructed its provisions. 
I. THINKING ABOUT THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In a recent article, I suggested that interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is improved by considering several positive and negative 
hypotheses that some other commentators do not share.35  First, the positive 
assertions:   
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the generation of 
political thinkers from which they sprang, regarded the 1787 Constitution 
as profoundly flawed.36  
―[B]y giving the slave states disproportionate power in the federal 
government,‖ they believed, ―[it] had created and empowered a complex 
political-social institution that the antebellum generation called the Slave 
Power.‖37 
The Republican leadership in the Thirty-Ninth Congress found itself in 
an unexpected conflict with President Andrew Johnson, who sought to 
remove Congress from any influence on Reconstruction policy or postwar 
politics.38  As a result, the leadership decided to write ―a multi-part, 
compromise amendment whose parts are best understood as forming a 
whole that, while not entirely coherent, does have a certain underlying 
congruence of concern.‖39 
The two negative propositions are: 
                                                 
 35. For a more detailed explanation of these assertions, see generally Don‘ts and Dos, 
supra note 33, at 441–57 (detailing the legislative history that led to the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 36. Id. at 448–51 (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in an attempt 
to remedy problems found within the Constitution).  
 37. Id. at 451.  See generally LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER:  THE FREE 
NORTH AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780–1861 2 (2000) (describing the slave power thesis 
as a widely held ―notion that a slaveholding oligarchy ran the country—and ran it for their 
own advantage‖). 
 38. See Epps, Don‘ts and Dos, supra note 33, at 455 (―Because of Congress‘s refusal to 
seat members from the South, Johnson argued, plenary authority over Reconstruction rested 
with him and him alone.‖). 
 39. Id. at 456. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment was not aimed solely at providing a 
minimum set of rights aimed only at racial discrimination against the freed 
slaves.40  In fact, it creates ―a broader set of rules for state politics and law,‖ 
which were inspired by the problems of immigrants and Southern 
Unionists.41 
The Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to provide a constitutional 
foundation for the Civil Rights Act of 1866; nor was it offered because its 
sponsors considered the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional otherwise.42  
The ―originalist‖ argument is that the legislative debates and (to a lesser 
extent) the overall history of American citizenship and political theory 
show a ―clear intent‖ that birthright citizenship should extend only to 
children of American citizens and perhaps of lawful permanent residents, 
but not reach the children of foreign nationals temporarily resident in the 
United States, whether legally or illegally.  In order to evaluate this 
argument, a reader need not accept my theses completely.  Instead, the 
interpretive process should begin with the interpretation we have been 
offered by advocates of a restrictive reading of the Clause, and should use 
constitutional tools, of which history is a prominent one, to assess the 
correctness of the suggested interpretation. 
The historical background cited by Dean Eastman is that sketched by 
Professors Schuck and Smith in their work on the theory of citizenship in 
Anglo-American legal theory.  The thesis of this work, and of subsequent 
work relied upon by restrictionists, is that modern, as opposed to feudal, 
citizenship requires consent of the citizen and a willingness to subject 
herself to the complete dominance of the nation.  Thus, children of 
temporary sojourners—and, for that matter, any persons retaining 
citizenship in more than one country at the same time—cannot be viewed 
as fulfilling the conditions for citizenship under a proper modern definition.  
Citizenship Without Consent is the foundation of the argument for a 
restrictive reading and thus merits a close reading.  That I disagree with its 
conclusions should not suggest that I deprecate its  
scholarly seriousness.  But I will suggest that it has two shortcomings:   
(1) it produces seemingly valid conclusions from the wrong sources and (2) 
it shortchanges and misunderstands the actual legislative record of the 
Clause.   
                                                 
 40. Id. at 441–42 (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 
(1976)) (noting that the Supreme Court ―has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment 
contains ‗a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular 
and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves‘‖). 
 41. Id. at 442–43. 
 42. Id. at 445–48 (arguing that the Citizenship Clause was drafted ―with a broad set of 
political and civil rights in mind‖). 
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The authors begin by tracing the conflict between ―ascriptive and 
consensual citizenship.‖43  Ascriptive citizenship, the condition of being a 
subject of the Crown by virtue of birth within the Realm, meant that a 
subject had neither the right to disobey nor to renounce citizenship even by 
expatriation.44  The authors suggest that with the dawn of the 
Enlightenment, authors, most prominently John Locke, called into question 
the justice and validity of the ascriptive principle, suggesting instead that 
true allegiance and citizenship could be based only on reciprocal consent.  
For Locke, ―[a] child . . . could not be a government‘s subject because 
subjectship must be based on the tacit or explicit consent of an individual 
who had reached the age of rational discretion.‖45  For this reason, ―Locke 
insisted:  ‗a Child is born a subject of no Country and Government.‘‖46  
Locke ―would have been astonished that children of illegal aliens might 
acquire membership in a country by birth.‖47 
The authors note that Locke is generally agreed to be a significant 
influence on the thinking of the Framers of the 1787 Constitution.  They 
further cite the work of G.J.A. Pocock as evidencing the importance for the 
Framers of the ―Atlantic tradition‖ of republican thought stemming from 
the work of Niccolo Machiavelli.48   
In Atlantic republican thought, republican societies were thought to require 
small size, internal homogeneity, and restricted citizenship.49 
Citizenship restriction, they suggest, is Lockean as well as 
Machiavellian: 
 [T]he logic of Locke‘s formulation of the social contract doctrine, like 
Rousseau‘s, indicated that consent to membership must indeed be 
mutual, granted by the representatives of the existing citizenry as well as 
by the prospective citizen.  Hence his view, as much as the republicans‘, 
implicitly sanctioned the permissibility, if not the desirability, of 
restrictive membership policies, at least so long as those restrictions did 
not amount to active violations of one‘s natural rights.
50
 
And they note that much of antebellum American law, most particularly 
the infamous Taney opinion in Scott v. Sandford51 (―Dred Scott‖), relied 
                                                 
 43. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
 44. See id. at 12, 17 (noting that expatriation was ―considered contrary to natural law 
and therefore impossible‖).  
 45. Id. at 25. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 25–26. 
 48. Id. at 27 (citing J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:  FLORENTINE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975)). 
 49. Id. at 27–29. 
 50. Id. at 30–31. 
 51. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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heavily on a consensual model, holding that persons of African descent 
were forever barred from citizenship because the Framers had not 
consented to their acquisition of it by any means.52  Schuck and Smith 
further argue that American citizenship law before the Fourteenth 
Amendment showed an inability to decide between ascription and consent 
as the basis of citizenship: 
American law‘s use of both ascriptive and consensual understandings of 
the birthrights of the native-born makes it difficult to know precisely 
what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Citizenship Clause had 
in mind, a difficulty not altogether alleviated by their debates.  It is 
therefore all the more important to recognize that the American 
Congress, courts, and statesmen had always drawn freely on both 
traditions, selecting among them largely on grounds of expediency.
53
 
They then proceed to a very brief discussion of the Citizenship Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and conclude that the ―subject to the 
jurisdiction‖ language embodies a restrictive, consensual definition of 
citizenship.54  The Amendment‘s ―central political ideas were not ascription 
and allegiance but consent and individual rights,‖ they contend.55  They 
reach this conclusion because they assert the common wisdom that 
―Congress‘s purpose in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment . . . was to 
‗constitutionalize‘ the protections established by the [Civil Rights Act of 
1866]‖ thus making the differences in wording between the Act and the 
Clause irrelevant.56 
To Schuck and Smith, the important question was what Senator Lyman 
Trumbull meant by the language.  Trumbull was the drafter of the Civil 
Rights Bill; he played no role in the drafting of the Amendment.  Thus, 
―subject to the jurisdiction,‖ the Amendment‘s language, becomes 
equivalent to ―not subject to any foreign power,‖ the eventual language of 
the Civil Rights Bill.  Subjection to a foreign power depended on 
allegiance, and, the authors contend, the Civil Rights ―debates revealed that 
Trumbull understood allegiance not chiefly in Coke‘s terms, as stemming 
                                                 
 52. Though the authors do not note this, the principle of Dred Scott is actually 
ascriptive in the highest, as not even the consent of both parties to the social contract—i.e., 
an aspiring citizen of African descent and a willing Congress making use of the 
naturalization power—could overcome the (unwritten or spoken) ascription by the Founding 
Generation of alien status to such people.  See id. at 452 (declaring the Missouri 
Compromise unconstitutional, and holding that Dred Scott could not be made free by being 
brought to Missouri by his owner, even if his owner had the intention of becoming a 
permanent resident in Missouri).  
 53. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 71. 
 54. Id. at 85–87. 
 55. Id. at 73. 
 56. Id. at 75. 
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from the fact of protection at birth, but in a more consensualist fashion, as 
dependent upon the wills of the community and the individual.‖57   
Little of this argument depends on the actual legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; but remarkably, a good deal of it arises out of the 
fact (which might as reasonably be ascribed to happenstance) that the 
Amendment was finally approved by the states during the Fortieth, not the 
Thirty-Ninth.  The Fortieth Congress passed the first formal act permitting 
United States citizens to renounce their citizenship.   
Congress could not have conceived of that obligation [of birthright 
citizenship] as perpetual or indissoluble on [the natural-born citizen‘s] 
part.  Only one day before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, 
Congress embraced the consensual conception of citizenship in a more 
direct and thoroughgoing way, affirming in the Expatriation Act of 1868 
the fundamental right of all citizens voluntarily to withdraw their consent 
and to renounce their membership.
58
 
This is a remarkable conclusion to draw from the mere coincidence of 
time.  Schuck and Smith gloss over the fact that Congress plays no part in 
ratification of Amendments, which is done by state legislatures and 
recorded (at that time) by the Secretary of State.59  As legislative history 
goes, then, the Schuck and Smith argument is a fairly unusual one.  It 
slights the actual language of the measure and the debates of the body that 
framed it, and insists on the primacy of (1) the language of and debates 
about a different measure (the Civil Rights Act) and (2) the unstated 
intentions of a different body (the Fortieth Congress).  Schuck and Smith 
bolster their reading of the real meaning of the clause on a couple of 
grounds that are important to constitutional construction generally.  The 
first might be called the argument for constitutional policy.   
In this case, they argue that the current reading of the Clause calls into 
question the underlying consistency and workability of the Constitution, 
and thus is potentially illegitimate:  
America‘s current circumstances confirm that birthright citizenship can 
create a problem of overinclusiveness, at least in consensual terms.  In 
particular, automatic political membership for the native-born children of 
illegal aliens and nonimmigrants seems difficult to defend, especially 
when access to citizenship for other needy groups must be limited.
60
 
                                                 
 57. Id. at 80. 
 58. Id. at 86 (footnote omitted). 
 59. Thus, for example, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, proposed by the First 
Congress in 1789, was finally ratified in 1992.  Can the debates of the 102nd Congress then 
tell us something about the ―intent‖ of the framers of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment? 
 60. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 89. 
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This policy argument is coupled with the common (and again, far from 
illegitimate when correctly made) argument that the Framers could not 
have foreseen current conditions:  
The number of illegal aliens presently in the United States is a matter of 
great and continuing controversy; estimates that are described as 
―conservative‖ place the range at three and a half to six million as of 
1980, with the number increasing by two hundred thousand annually.  
This reality and the fears that it has generated concerning its economic 
and social effects have transformed political discourse about American 
immigration policy in ways that neither [past courts] nor the 




In particular, the authors suggest that children of illegal immigrants did 
not at the time of Framing, do not now, and should not fall within the 
meaning of ―subject to the jurisdiction.‖  This is because the children carry 
at birth the taint of their parents‘ criminality:  ―The parents of such children 
are, by definition, individuals whose presence within the jurisdiction of the 
United States is prohibited by law.  They [the parents] are manifestly 
individuals, therefore, to whom the society has explicitly and self-
consciously decided to deny membership.‖62 
The Schuck and Smith argument thus considers (in roughly this order) 
(1) the intellectual background of American citizenship and the Citizenship 
Clause, in particular; (2) the circumstances and debate that surrounded its 
adoption; (3) the ―constitutional policy‖ underlying its current application; 
and (4) the likelihood that the Framers foresaw something like the present 
circumstances.  Each of their conclusions requires evidence to support it, 
and our task is to assess the nature and amount of evidence they have 
adduced for each.  
Schuck and Smith, as noted above, provide a truncated and  
(it must be said) idiosyncratic reading of the Clause‘s ―legislative history.‖  
Let‘s consider a more thoroughgoing and disciplined version of this, 
offered by Dean Eastman. 
 [T]he language of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, from which the Citizenship 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (like the rest of Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment) was derived so as to provide a more certain 
constitutional foundation for the 1866 Act, strongly suggests that 
Congress did not intend to provide for such a broad and absolute 
birthright citizenship.
63
   
                                                 
 61. Id. at 93. 
 62. Id. at 95.  
 63. John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court:  Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left 
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This language, as enacted, was ―all persons born in the United States and 
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States.‖64   
Dean Eastman claims that ―this formulation makes clear, [that] any child 
born on U.S. soil to parents who were temporary visitors to this country 
and who, as a result of the foreign citizenship of the child‘s parents, 
remained a citizen or subject of the parents‘ home country, was not entitled 
to claim the birthright citizenship provided in the 1866 Act.‖65  The 
relevance of this supposed clarity, of course, is not direct, because the aim 
is to interpret the language of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Citizenship 
Clause, which says that ―[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside.‖66  Dean Eastman admits that 
this language lacks the alleged clarity of the language in the Act, and 
indeed ―might easily have been intended to describe a broader grant of 
citizenship than the negatively phrased language from the 1866 Act—one 
more in line with the contemporary understanding . . . that birth on U.S. 
soil is sufficient for citizenship.‖67  
This is an important admission, because to discern ―clear intent‖ in 
language that ―might easily‖ be read a different way requires strong 
evidence that the Framers intended one specific reading.  To resolve this 
ambiguity, Dean Eastman turns to the legislative debates:  
 [T]he relatively sparse debate we have regarding this provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not support such a reading.  For example, 
when pressed about whether Indians living on reservations would be 
covered by the clause since they were ―most clearly subject to our 
jurisdiction, both civil and military,‖ Senator Lyman Trumbull, a key 
figure in the drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
responded that ―subject to the jurisdiction‖ of the United States meant 
subject to its ―complete‖ jurisdiction, ―[n]ot owing allegiance to anybody 
else.‖  Senator Jacob Howard, who introduced the language of the 
jurisdiction clause on the floor of the Senate, contended that it should be 
construed to mean ―a full and complete jurisdiction . . . the same 
                                                 
Because of Embarrassment Over Bush v. Gore? 94 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1485–86 (2006). 
 64. Id. at 1486 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) 
(emphasis added)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 67. Eastman, supra note 63, at 1486.  This seems like a concession on Dean Eastman‘s 
part—the ―clear intent‖ must be deduced from unclear text, but it conceals a hidden 
premise—that the text is in fact ambiguous or unclear.  The first necessity for a 
counterintuitive ―originalist‖ reading is ambiguity in the text.  If ―all persons‖ really means 
―all persons‖ then the deployment of originalist machinery is hardly necessary, and if the 
machinery produces a different reading its very validity is questionable. 
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jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United 
States now‖ (i.e., under the 1866 Act).  That meant that the children of 
Indians who still ―belong[ed] to a tribe‖ and hence owed allegiance to 
another sovereign (however dependent the sovereign was) would not 
qualify for citizenship under the Clause.  Because of this interpretative 
gloss provided by the authors of the provision, an amendment offered by 
Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin to explicitly exclude ―Indians not 
taxed,‖ as the 1866 Act had done, was rejected as redundant.
68
 
From this summary of the debate, Dean Eastman then concludes that the 
correct meaning of the Clause is that supplied by the majority in The 
Slaughterhouse Cases:69  ―[T]he ‗main purpose‘ of the Clause ‗was to 
establish the citizenship of the negro,‘ and that ‗[t]he phrase, ‗subject to its 
jurisdiction‘ was intended to exclude from its operation children of 
ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the 
United States.‘‖70 
This, then, is the ―originalist‖ claim to establish the ―clear intent‖ of the 
Framers and ratifiers.  Thus, it would be significant if (as I suggest) the 
argument (1) misapprehends the contemporaneous intellectual background 
of the Clause; (2) mischaracterizes the relationship between the Civil 
Rights Act and the Clause; (3) distorts the tenor of (or simply neglects to 
quote) the legislative debates around the Clause itself; (4) offers an 
implausible reading of the constitutional policy embodied in the 
Amendment as a whole; and (5) fails to understand that, historically, the 
Framers of the Amendment faced a situation with regard to immigration 
policy that was in fact remarkably similar to, not radically different from, 
our current one.  Weakness or invalidity in one or more of the stages of the 
argument, it seems to me, would suggest that proponents of a restrictive 
―intent‖ of the Clause have failed to carry their burden of proof. 
II. THE FRAMING OF THE CLAUSE:  BACKGROUND AND DEBATE 
The quest for the ―clear intent‖ of the Framers of the Clause ought to 
begin with what the Framers said, first in the text of the Clause and second 
during the debates over its adoption.  The Thirty-Ninth Congress dealt with 
the issue of birth and citizenship in two different bills, first in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and second in the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is 
important to resist the temptation to treat these two measures and the 
                                                 
 68. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 69. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 70. Eastman, supra note 63, at 1486–87. 
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debates over them as if they were one and the same.71  They originated with 
different sponsors and were buttressed by different constitutional theories.   
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was adopted first, was sponsored by 
Senator Lyman Trumbull, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and 
reported by that Committee for adoption by the Senate and then the House.  
The Act was a conservative measure, designed to conciliate President 
Johnson and gain his signature.72  According to its sponsor, the Act as a 
whole was enacted pursuant to section two of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
and the specific citizenship language was authorized by Congress‘s 
Naturalization Power.73  The Act was designed to put the responsibility for 
enforcing civil rights in the hands of the federal courts.74   
But, despite its conservatism, Andrew Johnson vetoed it, in essence 
proclaiming himself opposed to any attempts to upset the antebellum 
political system of white rule and ―states‘ rights.‖  Johnson‘s veto of the 
Act, and of the Freedmen‘s Bureau Act, radicalized the political situation in 
Washington and convinced most of the Congressional leadership that no 
conciliation was possible.  A mark of that radicalization is that Congress re-
passed both bills over the President‘s veto—the first time in American 
history that a Presidential veto of a substantive bill had been overridden.75   
 During this near-revolutionary period, the Fourteenth Amendment 
was drafted, not by Trumbull and the Judiciary Committee but by the 
considerably more radical Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction.  
That committee was seeking to wrest control of Reconstruction from 
Johnson.  Because it was offering a constitutional amendment, it did not 
worry about the limits of congressional power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment; because a President has no veto power over a proposed 
constitutional amendment, it made no concessions to the President‘s 
conservative views.  Neither in its language nor in the debates surrounding 
its passage is there any suggestion that, like the Civil Rights Bill, it was a 
―court bill.‖  
For all these reasons, it seems at best reductive to assume that the 
citizenship language in both had identical meanings and ―intentions.‖  If 
that is to be a premise of the restrictive reading of the document, it must be 
                                                 
 71. See Don‘ts and Dos, supra note 33, at 445–57. 
 72. EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 175–76. 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power ―to establish an uniform 
rule of naturalization‖).  
 74. Democracy Reborn, supra note 33, at 175 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST 
SESS. 605 (1866)) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) (―It is a court bill; it is to be executed through 
the courts, and in no other way.‖). 
 75. EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 183. 
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subject to the same burden of proof as the other premises; the proponents 
have not even tried to bear that burden. 
As originally written, Trumbull‘s Civil Rights Bill proclaimed that all 
persons of ―African descent‖ resident in the United States were citizens.  
However, on January 30, Trumbull withdrew this language and offered an 
amendment to insert this language:  ―[A]ll persons born in the United 
States, and not subject to any foreign Power, are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States . . . .‖76 
It is this Civil Rights Bill language that the proponents of a restrictive 
reading of the Clause regard as indicating the Fourteenth Amendment 
Framers‘ ―intent‖ to limit birthright citizenship to, in essence, children 
whose parents had no other citizenship status elsewhere in the world.  The 
argument is that children of foreign citizens temporarily resident in the 
United States are ―subject to [the] foreign power‖ governing their parents‘ 
citizenship.  Immediately after the new wording was offered, however, 
Trumbull engaged in a colloquy that sheds a considerably different light on 
this provision.  Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, a conservative 
Republican and one of Johnson‘s few remaining Republican supporters in 
Congress, archly asked Trumbull whether this language would naturalize 
the ―children of Chinese and Gypsies born in this country?‖ Trumbull 
replied, ―Undoubtedly.‖77 
What is the importance of this colloquy?  Well, consider that in 1866, 
Chinese-born people resident in the United States were ineligible to 
naturalize as citizens.  Under the Naturalization Act of 1790, naturalized 
citizenship was limited to ―free white person[s].‖78  Thus, every immigrant 
from China was by definition not only an alien but a ―subject‖ of the 
Chinese empire and thus not subject to the ―full and complete jurisdiction‖ 
that originalists regard as important restrictive language. 
But if this was the intended meaning of ―not subject to a foreign power,‖ 
how could it be ―[u]ndoubtedly‖ true that children of Chinese were to be 
citizens under the Civil Rights Act?  The answer seems nonsensical; and 
before we deal with the anomaly by suggesting that Trumbull simply did 
not understand what he was talking about, remember that Trumbull‘s is 
preeminent among those whose ―clear intent‖ we are supposedly parsing. 
The casual reference to ―Gypsies‖ in Senator Cowan‘s question also 
foreshadowed a theme that would become quite important during the 
debate over the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Chinese 
                                                 
 76. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 498 (1866). 
 77. Id. 
 78. An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). 
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immigrants were present in the United States legally, and were (as we have 
seen) citizens of another nation.   
The ―Gypsies‖ in the United States (assuming there were any) were the 
closest thing the United States had at that time to ―illegal‖ immigrants—a 
shadow population that was considered to be living in defiance of 
American law.79  Their status and the language used about them 
subsequently in the debate are quite suggestive.80 
Who, then, were those not subject to ―the full and complete jurisdiction‖ 
of the United States?  There were two classes.  The first covered ―children 
of public ministers‖—what we would call diplomats today, who were 
covered by diplomatic immunity under international law.  The second was 
a subset of the Native American population—those living under tribal 
government on reservations under treaties that recognized their tribes as 
separate sovereigns and those resident on the frontier in territory and 
among tribal groups that had not been reduced to federal control.  The first 
group of Native people were ―subject‖ to their tribal governments, which 
had treaty immunities to U.S. court jurisdiction.  The second were not 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction at all—they were ―wild Indians.‖ 
Bear in mind that we are still discussing the Civil Rights Act.  As 
eventually adopted, it read, ―[a]ll persons born in the United States and not 
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States.‖  This language is significant 
but does not directly demonstrate anything about the ―clear intent‖ of the 
Citizenship Clause.  First, it is a statute, enacted under the authority of 
some combination of the Naturalization Clause and the Thirteenth 
Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment is a change to the Constitution, 
creating entirely new rights and providing government with new powers.  
Second, it is different in wording.  Even if we were to conclude that ―not 
                                                 
 79. This is of course true as a statement of the relatively undeveloped federal law of 
immigration before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  There were, however, other 
classes of people who were not supposed to be present in the specific states, and in the 
antebellum period they were subject to penalties under state law that echo some of those 
aimed at ―illegal aliens‖ today.  See Neuman, supra note 23,  
at 497–99.  Professor Neuman also asks whether Schuck and Smith could possibly be 
suggesting that the Amendment does not recognize the citizenship of native-born children of 
African slaves imported in violation of the 1808 federal statute that prohibited importation 
of slaves.  Those African slaves were in the country illegally, in the teeth of efforts to 
discourage their entry.  See id. 
80.  Gypsies in 1866 existed mostly as a bugaboo in the mind of Nativists (like the phantom 
cases of leprosy frequently mentioned by Lou Dobbs or the ―terror babies‖ being cleverly 
spawned in U.S. hospitals so that they can commit suicide bombings a generation from 
now).  ―For example in 1874, the American Cyclopaedia argued that it was ‗questionable 
whether a band of genuine Gypsies has ever been in America.‘‖  BRIAN A. BELTON, 
QUESTIONING GYPSY IDENTITY:  ETHNIC NARRATIVES IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 85 (2005). 
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subject to any foreign power‖ had a more restrictive meaning than its 
sponsors appeared to give it, the language was superseded by the broader 
language of the Citizenship Clause.  So even if we could demonstrate the 
―clear intent‖ of the Congress when it adopted the Act, that ―clear intent‖ 
could not restrict what the Congress and the state legislatures did later in 
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment.  And, finally, the evidence does not 
establish a ―clear intent‖ to adopt a restrictive meaning.  As I read the 
record, it points to an opposite intent; but even if my reading is contestable, 
I suggest that its plausibility establishes that the ―originalists‖ have signally 
failed to bear their burden of proof even as to this preliminary question. 
In fact, the meaning that matters in this context is that of the Citizenship 
Clause, which was framed by Congress two months after the final passage 
of the Civil Rights Act and ratified over the ensuing two years by the state 
legislatures. It has different wording; it emerged from a different political 
situation; it was adopted under different procedures and had different 
authors, and it was approved by different voting bodies.81  Its meaning must 
stand on its own.  If its broad wording, which makes no mention of 
―foreign powers,‖ is to be read restrictively, it must be because of 
something in its text or adoption, not because it is viewed as a coded re-
enactment of the Civil Rights Act.  
The draft Fourteenth Amendment was introduced in the House of 
Representatives in May 1866, and adopted by the House without any 
citizenship language.82  The Journals of the Joint Committee of Fifteen thus 
shed no light on its drafting; neither do the initial debates on the draft 
amendment in the House, because the draft did not address citizenship 
when adopted by the House.  The only debate that can shed light on its 
intent is that which took place on the Senate floor during the process of 
adoption and amendment of the citizenship language.83 
                                                 
 81. See EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 183, 226–27 (illustrating the 
differences regarding motivation, political climate, and passage/ratification between the 
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 82. See id. at 225 (demonstrating that most of the House debate focused on 
representation and voting, not citizenship). 
 83. When the amended Joint Resolution was sent back to the House for concurrence, 
the only mention of the citizenship language was in the final remarks of Representative 
Thaddeus Stevens, the Radical leader of the House, the dominant member of the Joint 
Committee of Fifteen, and the primary sponsor of the proposed Amendment.  See id. at 40–
50 (providing a brief synopsis of Stevens‘ tenure in Congress).  On this occasion, Stevens 
described the effect of the draft amendment with no qualification for the jurisdictional 
language: 
The first section is altered by defining who are citizens of the United States 
and of the States.  This is an excellent amendment, long needed to settle 
conflicting decisions between the several States and the United States.  It 
declares this great privilege to belong to every person born or naturalized in 
the United States. 
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When it came to the floor of the Senate on May 23, Senator Benjamin 
Wade proposed an amendment that would remove the word ―citizen‖ from 
what became the ―privileges or immunities‖ clause and substitute language 
barring states from abridging ―the privileges or immunities of persons born 
in the United States or naturalized by the laws thereof.‖84  Wade explained, 
the word ―citizen‖ . . . is a term about which there has been a good deal 
of uncertainty in our Government.  The courts have stumbled on the 
subject, and even here, at this session, that question has been up and it is 
still regarded by some as doubtful.  I regard it as settled by the civil 
rights bill, and, indeed, in my judgment, it  
was settled before.  I have always believed that every person, of 
whatever race or color, who was born within the United States was a 
citizen of the United States; but by the decisions of the courts there has 
been a doubt thrown over that subject; and if the Government should fall 
into the hands of those who are opposed to the views that some of us 
maintain, those who have been accustomed to take a different view of it, 
they may construe the provision in such a way as we do not think it 




This is an unmistakable reference to the restrictive reading of citizenship 
given by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott, and Wade‘s change seemed to 
be designed to forestall a racial reading of citizenship by later judicial 
construction of the Civil Rights Act.86  Wade‘s definition of citizenship, in 
his words, was that ―every person, of whatever race or color, who was born 
within the United States was a citizen of the United States.‖87  
An instructive colloquy ensued between Wade and Senator William Pitt 
Fessenden of Maine, chair of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.  As 
reported by Wade, ―[t]he Senator from Maine suggests to me, in an 
undertone, that persons may be born in the United States and yet not be 
citizens of the United States.  Most assuredly they would be citizens of the 
United States unless they went to another country and expatriated 
themselves . . . .‖ 88 
Fessenden then suggested the very question that concerns us today: 
―Suppose a person is born here of parents from abroad temporarily in this 
country.‖89  Wade answered,   
                                                 
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 3148 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens).  
 84. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2768 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wade).  
 85. Id. at 2768–69. 
 86. Perhaps it might even be a sign of ―clear intent‖ that a judicial construction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would never narrow citizenship on similar grounds. 
 87. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2768 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wade).  
 88. Id. at 2769 (remarks of Sen. Wade).  
 89. Id. (remarks of Sen. Fessenden). 
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The Senator says a person may be born here and not be a citizen.  I know 
that is so in one instance, in the case of the children of foreign ministers 
who reside ―near‖ the United States, in the diplomatic language.  By a 
fiction of law such persons are not supposed to be residing here, and 
under that fiction of law their children would not be citizens of the 
United States, although born in Washington.  I agree to that, but my 
answer to the suggestion is that that is a simple matter, for it could hardly 
be applicable to more than two or three or four persons; and it would be 
best not to alter the law for that case.
90
 
Debate then turned to the meaning of other provisions of the draft 
amendment, particularly the language regarding apportionment of 
representation to states that restricted the franchise by race.  After 
adjournment that day, Senate Republicans met in a private caucus to 
consider the issues that Wade‘s amendment had brought up. 
When the measure returned to the floor on May 30, Senator Jacob 
Howard of Michigan, a member of the Joint Committee and the Senate 
sponsor of the draft amendment, proposed new language:  ―[A]ll persons 
born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside.‖ 91  The 
debate on this new language forms the core of the evidence for a restrictive 
reading of the Citizenship Clause; but read in full, the debate suggests 
precisely the opposite reading.   
 Howard explained the meaning of the new language as   
simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that 
every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to 
their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of 
the United States.  This will not, of course, include persons born in the 
United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of 
ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the 
United States, but will include every other class of persons.
92
  
                                                 
 90. Id. (remarks of Sen. Wade). 
 91. Id. at 2890 (remarks of Sen. Howard).   
 92. Id. Professor Mayton reads this language as excluding the children of two classes of 
aliens from birthright citizenship:  first, all ―consular personnel,‖ and, second, ―aliens.‖  
Mayton, supra note 26, at 245.  That is, we should construe Howard as meaning that the 
citizenship clause will exclude the ―two classes,‖ consisting in essence of (1) the children of 
all foreigners and (2) the children of some foreigners.  Id.  Professor Mayton considers his 
thesis confirmed because ―at that time no objection was made.‖  Id.  The most logical 
inference to this reader is that no one objected because no one understood it in the strained 
way that Professor Mayton does.  At this point in the inquiry, we are in danger of leaving 
the world of constitutional history and entering some kind of Da Vinci code alternate 
universe.  That is, can we really suppose that this one ambiguous phrase spoken by one 
senator, no matter how read, can supply us with a code key to general language adopted by 
both Houses of Congress and the legislatures of two-thirds of the States?  Rather than 
picking at coded meanings in disaggregated phrases, an interpreter would do better to 
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Once again, the irrepressible Senator Cowan rose to object that the 
proponents of the draft amendment could surely not mean that birthright 
citizenship would extend to children of Chinese immigrants or of 
―Gypsies‖:  ―[I]s it proposed that the people of California are to remain 
quiescent while they are overrun by a flood of immigration of the Mongol 
race?  Are they to be immigrated out of house and home by Chinese?  I 
should think not.‖  Further, his own state of Pennsylvania had to contend 
with   
a certain number of people who invade her borders; who owe to her no 
allegiance; who pretend to owe none; who recognize no authority in her 
government; who have a distinct, independent government of their 
own—an imperium in imperio; who pay no taxes; who never perform 
military service; who do nothing, in fact, which becomes the citizen, and 
perform none of the duties which devolve upon him, but, on the other 
hand, have no homes, pretend to own no land, live nowhere, settle as 
trespassers wherever they go . . . .  
I mean the Gypsies. . . . If the mere fact of being born in the country 




Citizenship, in Cowan‘s view, had two essential characteristics that the 
proposed amendment would obliterate.  First, it was primarily under the 
control of the states, and no one could be a United States citizen who was 
not first recognized as such by a state.94  Second, the rights of citizenships 
were properly drawn from ―my own people, the people of my own blood 
and lineage, people of the same religion, people of the same beliefs and 
traditions,‖ rather than from ―a society of other men entirely different in all 
those respects from myself.‖95 
                                                 
consider the entire debate in its context and Professor Mayton seems to have little interest in 
or understanding of political context in the 439th Congress.  Later in his article, Professor 
Mayton cites statements by Senator Cowan as definitively explaining that the Amendment 
did not make children of foreigners citizens.  Id. at 243.  A reader would not know that 
Cowan was the speaker, however, that Cowan was an opponent of the draft Amendment, 
nor that Cowan was arguing against its adoption.  Professor Mayton seizes upon the 
significance of statements made by opponents of a measure and gives them authoritative 
force; it is as if one were to consult the papers of Jefferson Davis for definitive exegesis of 
the Emancipation Proclamation.  As it happens, Davis wrote that the Proclamation was 
intended as an ―intimation to the people of the North that they must prepare to submit to a 
separation, now become inevitable, for that people are too acute not to understand that a 
restoration of the Union has been rendered forever impossible by the adoption of a measure 
which, from its very nature, neither admits of retraction nor can coexist with union.‖  See  
6 J. OF THE CONG. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 18 (1863). 
 93. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890–91 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan).   
 94. Id. at 2891.   
 95. Id. 
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The response on the floor was delivered by Senator John Conness of 
California, himself a naturalized citizen born in Ireland:  
The proposition before us, I will say, Mr. President, relates simply to the 
children begotten of Chinese parents in California, and it is proposed to 
declare that they shall be citizens. . . . I voted for the proposition to 
declare that the children of all parentage whatever, born in California, 
should be regarded and treated as citizens of the United States, entitled to 
equal civil rights with other citizens of the United States.
96
 
As for the danger of Gypsy hordes, Conness noted that ―I have lived in 
the United States for now many a year, and really I have heard more about 
Gypsies within the last two or three months than I have heard before in my 
life.‖97 
The debate quickly turned to the real question that hung over the 
―subject to the jurisdiction‖ language:  the citizenship status of reservation 
and ―wild‖ Indians.  Here is where the advocates of a restrictive reading 
incompletely quote Trumbull.  The evidence is overwhelming that the 
debate consisted of two strands—one made up of rhetorical points scored 
by Cowan and fellow opponents, the other made up of genuine concerns by 
supporters of the bill that it might inadvertently open citizenship to the 
group of Native Americans still living beyond the American legal system.   
The Indian question arose when Senator James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin 
offered an amendment that would have added the words ―excluding Indians 
not taxed‖ to the Clause.  Doolittle, from a frontier state, told the Senate 
that  
I moved this amendment because it seems to me very clear that there is a 
large mass of the Indian population who are clearly subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States who ought not to be included as citizens 
of the United States.  All the Indians upon reservations within the several 
States are most clearly subject to our jurisdiction, both civil and 
military. . . . For instance, there are seven or eight thousand Navajoes 
[sic] at the moment under the control of General Carlton, in New 
Mexico, upon the Indian reservations, managed, controlled, fed at the 
expense of the United States, and fed by the War Department, managed 
by the War Department, and at a cost to this Government of almost a 
million and a half of dollars every year. . . . Are these six or seven 
thousand Navajoes [sic] to be made citizens of the United States?  Go 
into the State of Kansas, and you find there any number of reservations, 
Indians in all stages, from the wild Indian of the plains, who lives on 
nothing but the meat of the buffalo, to those Indians who are partially 
                                                 
 96. Id. (remarks of Sen. Conness). 
 97. Id. at 2892. 
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civilized and have partially adopted the habits of civilized life.  So it is in 
other States.  In my own state there are the Chippewas, the remnants of 
the Winnebagoes, [sic] and the Pottawatomies.  There are tribes in the 
State of Minnesota and other States of the Union.  Are these persons to 
be regarded as citizens of the United States, and by a constitutional 
amendment declared to be such, because they are born within the United 
States and subject to our jurisdiction? . . .  Take Colorado; there are more 
Indian citizens of Colorado than there are white citizens this moment 
[sic] if you admit it as a State.
98
 
Doolittle pointed out that the Constitution as written in 1787 excluded 
―Indians not taxed‖ from the enumeration of the people for purposes of 
Congressional representation.  His amendment, he suggested, would simply 
make explicit that this exclusion applied to citizenship as well.  At this 
point, Senator Fessenden admitted that he was unsure about the effect of 
the proposed language, and asked Senator Trumbull, ―who has investigated 
the civil rights bill so thoroughly,‖ for his views.99 
Here is where Trumbull gives his famous gloss on the words as meaning 
―subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof.‖100  In this context, he is 
discussing the question of the citizenship status of Native peoples in the 
United States. 
What do we mean by ―subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?‖  
Not owing allegiance to anybody else.  That is what it means.  Can you 
sue a Navajoe [sic] Indian in court?  Are they in any sense subject to the 
complete jurisdiction of the United States?  By no means.  We make 
treaties with them, and therefore they are not subject to our jurisdiction.  
If they were, we would not make treaties with them.  If we want to 
control the Navajoes, [sic] or any other Indians of which the Senator 
from Wisconsin has spoken, how do we do it?  Do we pass a law to 
control them?  Are they subject to our jurisdiction in that sense?  Is it not 
understood that if we want to make arrangements with the Indians to 
whom he refers we do it by means of a treaty?
101
  
But not all Indian people were settled on reservations or still ―wild.‖  
Many lived within the normal bounds of non-reservation communities.  ―If 
they are there and within the jurisdiction of Colorado, and subject to the 
                                                 
 98. Id. at 2892 (remarks of Sen. Doolittle). 
 99. Id. at 2893 (remarks of Sen. Fessenden).  Note that Fessenden is not turning to 
Trumbull as the author of the measure (he wasn‘t), nor does he say that the new language 
means exactly what the different language of the Civil Rights Bill meant.  He turns to 
Trumbull because of his work on the question of citizenship.  Trumbull himself immediately 
said, ―Of course my opinion is not any better than that of any other member of the Senate.‖  
Id. (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) (emphasis added). 
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laws of Colorado, they ought to be citizens; and that is all that is 
proposed.‖102 
The distinction implied by ―subject to the jurisdiction,‖ Trumbull said, 
was that between Native people who lived under their own governments 
and outside of the legal and social system of the United States on the one 
hand and those who were settled in communities that were part of that 
system.103  The ―excluding Indians not taxed‖ language had been included 
in the Civil Rights Bill, and it was  
(as Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland now pointed out) included in 
section two of the draft amendment (and of course in Article I of the 
original Constitution).104  Trumbull replied that the language in section two 
of the Amendment referred only to ―Indians not taxed‖ within the borders 
of a state of the Union (since it pertained to apportionment of members of 
the House, who can only come from a State); if introduced into section one, 
it would ―refer[] to persons everywhere, whether in the States or in the 
Territories or in the District of Columbia.‖105 
If the ―not taxed‖ language were moved outside of its apportionment 
context, Trumbull suggested, it might be read to refer to ―the fact of 
taxation‖ rather than to ―describe a class of persons.‖106  If that happened, 
―it would make of a wealthy Indian a citizen and would not make a citizen 
of one not possessed of wealth under the same circumstances.‖107  Because 
of that potential ambiguity, Trumbull said, ―the language proposed in this 
constitutional amendment is better than the language in the civil rights 
bill.‖108 
That language was sufficient to exclude those Native bands not yet under 
full national jurisdiction, he added:  
They are not subject to our jurisdiction in the sense of owing allegiance 
solely to the United States; and the Senator from Maryland, if he will 
look into our statutes, will search in vain for any means of trying these 
wild Indians.  A person can only be tried for a criminal offense in 
pursuance of laws, and he must be tried in a district which must have 
been fixed by law before the crime was committed.  We have had in this 
                                                 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (―Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each state, excluding Indians not taxed.‖); see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (―Representatives 
and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their 
respective Numbers . . . excluding Indians not taxed.‖) 
 105. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2894 (1866). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  
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country and have to-day, a large region of country within the territorial 
limits of the United States, unorganized, over which we do not pretend to 
exercise any civil or criminal jurisdiction, where wild tribes of Indians 
roam at pleasure, subject to their own laws and regulations, and we do 




Senator Thomas Hendricks of Indiana, a Democrat who had been a 
persistent foe of the Civil Rights Act, then suggested that Congress had the 
legal authority, if it chose, to extend its laws to the ―wild Indians,‖ even if 
it lacked the physical power to enforce them at present.110  Trumbull replied 
rather tartly that Congress would have ―the same power that it has to extend 
the laws of the United States over Mexico.‖111 
Senator Jacob Howard, the Senate sponsor of the proposed constitutional 
amendment, now weighed in:  
I concur entirely with the honorable Senator from Illinois, in holding that 
the word ‗jurisdiction,‘ as here employed, ought to be construed so as to 
imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, 
coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United 
States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the 
judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and 
quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now.  Certainly, 
gentlemen cannot contend that an Indian belonging to a tribe, although 
born within the limits of a State, is subject to this full and complete 
jurisdiction.   
. . . .  
The United States courts have no power to punish an Indian who is 
connected with a tribe for a crime committed by him upon another 
member of the same tribe.
112
  
After this, the ―Indians not taxed‖ language was rejected113 and the 
debate moved on to the wording of the other sections of the draft 
amendment.   
Here we have a preliminary ―legislative history‖ of the Citizenship 
Clause.  Unlike the rest of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, none 
of this history takes place in committee, where a full record was not kept.114  
What do we conclude from it in relation to the ―intent‖ of its Framers about 
                                                 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (remarks of Sen. Hendricks). 
 111. Id. (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).  Senator Fessenden in fact insisted that Congress 
could do that as well if it chose.  Id. (remarks of Sen. Fessenden). 
 112. Id. at 2895 (remarks of Sen. Howard). 
 113. Id. at 2897. 
 114. The Clause was first drawn up in a Republican caucus, and we have no record of its 
deliberations. 
GARRETT EPPS 60.2 
360 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:331 
 
the application of the Clause to citizens born to alien parents present in the 
United States?   
One is first struck by the applicability of the earliest colloquy to this 
precise question.  Remember that Dean Eastman, at least, would construe 
the Clause to deny citizenship to Yasser Esam Hamdi and other children 
born to alien parents legally but temporarily resident in the United States.115  
Those parents, I suggest, are in precisely the same position as were the 
Chinese nationals resident in California, who were allowed in for purposes 
of labor—and were thus present legally—but who were ineligible for 
citizenship on grounds of race.  Their children, the debate makes clear, 
would, under the proponents‘ interpretation, be natural-born citizens under 
the Clause.  The implication for Hamdi and others like him, as a matter of 
―original intent‖ is clear; it is the opposite of the ―clear intent‖ 
restrictionists discern. 
Second, the discussion of Gypsies provides about the closest thing we 
are likely to get to the issue of illegal immigration.  Recall that at this time 
there was no federal category of illegal immigrant.  But Lou Dobbs could 
not describe with greater disapproval the characteristics of an ―illegal‖ 
population within United States borders—inassimilable, defiant, criminal, 
nomadic, ungovernable—than the description given by Senator Cowan of 
the Gypsy population of his state.  The proponents of the amendment, on 
the evidence of the record, gave an unqualified affirmation of the 
citizenship of American-born Gypsy children.  If we are disposed to infer 
intent analogically, I would suggest that the evidence more readily supports 
the broad reading of the Clause than the restrictive one. 
The language relied upon by advocates of a restrictive reading was 
uttered entirely within the context of citizenship of tribal Indians.  The 
language about ―full and complete jurisdiction‖ refers to the legal 
immunities of these Indians, not in any way to immigrant populations 
within the United States.  And the definition that the proponents offer of 
that ―full and complete‖ jurisdiction is a practical one, owing little to 
notions of ―ascription‖ or ―consent.‖  A person, Trumbull and Howard said, 
is subject to the jurisdiction if he or she can be summoned by and sued in 
an American court or if he or she can be prosecuted criminally for actions 
taking place on United States soil.116  ―Wild‖ and reservation Indians had, 
in essence, a limited extraterritoriality while on their own territory, even 
though it was within the borders of the nation; they were, in Senator 
                                                 
 115. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 116.  See supra notes 101, 112 and accompanying text. 
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Trumbull‘s analogy, like Mexicans living in Mexico.117  There was, 
however, no racial or national-origin component to this exception—as 
Trumbull said, Indians born in Colorado and living in its borders as 
ordinary Coloradoans ought to be and would be citizens under the 
Clause.118   
The analogous question, therefore, ought to be the following:  If an 
―illegal alien,‖ or the American-born child of such an alien, commits a civil 
wrong—involvement in an automobile accident, say—on United States 
soil, can he or she be sued?  If such a person commits a crime on United 
States soil, can he or she be tried and punished?  The answers to these 
questions are self-evident.  The only aliens who are immune from this civil 
and criminal jurisdiction are those who come here under explicit grants of 
diplomatic immunity—that is, the precise ―public ministers‖ (and their 
children) whom Senator Howard, by any natural reading of his remarks on 
introducing the clause, indicated as the sole exceptions to its declaration. 
If, then, it was the ―clear intent‖ of the Framers that children of aliens 
not be covered by the clause, it seems reasonable to ask what would 
possibly be an unclear intent.  The process of unearthing this putative 
―clear intent‖ calls to mind the remark attributed to Winston Churchill upon 
his defeat for re-election as Prime Minister in 1945.  Churchill‘s wife 
suggested that the defeat might be ―a blessing in disguise.‖119  ―At the 
moment,‖ he replied, ―it seems quite effectively disguised.‖120 
III. TRAVELS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Many of the men (and they were all men)121 who actually framed the 
Fourteenth Amendment were highly accomplished lawyers.  Lyman 
Trumbull, in particular, was one of the more accomplished appellate 
advocates of the Illinois bar,122 and William P. Fessenden, chair of the Joint 
Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, was among the small elite 
                                                 
 117. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 119. DAVID REYNOLDS, IN COMMAND OF HISTORY:  CHURCHILL FIGHTING AND WRITING 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 5 (2005).  
 120. Id. 
 121. One of the most poignant aspects of reading accounts of the Thirty-Ninth Congress‘ 
translation of the ideals of the anti-slavery and Abolitionist movements into constitutional 
text is the alacrity with which these practical men abandoned the important thread of anti-
slavery thought that challenged the legal and social subordination of women.  See EPPS, 
DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 33, at 205–21. 
 122. See id. at 126; RALPH J. ROSKE, HIS OWN COUNSEL:  THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LYMAN 
TRUMBULL 3 (1979) (describing Trumbull as a powerful and successful debater); MARK M. 
KRUG, LYMAN TRUMBULL:  CONSERVATIVE RADICAL 24–28 (1965) (referring to Trumbull‘s 
reputation as an excellent and logical debater who prepared his cases with extreme care).  
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Supreme Court bar of his time.123  Jacob Howard had been attorney general 
of Michigan124—at that time a frontier state in which Indian relations were 
quite important.  Benjamin Wade had been both a county prosecutor125 and 
a state judge126 before ascending to the Senate.  When we hear these men 
debate jurisdictional issues, we are not listening to a theoretical debate 
about jurisdiction, sovereignty, and the theories of Grotius and Vattel, but 
the concerns of practical men about highly developed doctrines in 
American domestic law.  As the foregoing debate illustrates, foremost in 
the minds of these Framers was the question of how the Citizenship Clause 
would affect the legal status of American Indians both within and without 
what was then called ―Indian country.‖  We must be careful not to allow 
legal concepts of Indian status current in the twenty-first century to mislead 
us into believing that Indian law at the time was analogous to Indian law 
today.   
The discussion of ―subject to the jurisdiction‖ in the Citizenship Clause 
began as a discussion of whether it was an adequate substitute for ―Indians 
not taxed,‖ the phrase used in Article I of the Constitution to exclude 
Indians from congressional apportionment and in the Civil Rights Bill to 
indicate all those covered by that bill‘s citizenship provision.  From 1789 
until 1868, according to a standard work in the field,  
 [o]nly those few Indians who had severed their tribal relations and 
individually joined non-Indian communities were considered to be 
subject to ordinary laws in a manner that made it appropriate to count 
them in the apportionment of direct federal taxes or for representation in 
Congress.   
. . . .  
[T]he phrase ―Indians not taxed‖ was not a grant of tax exemption; it 
described an existing status.‖
127
 
Indians who had not severed their ties with their tribes lived in ―Indian 
country.‖  This phrase was not a general description but a term of art 
carefully defined by statute128 as  
                                                 
 123. Fessenden, a godson and legal associate of Daniel Webster, argued eight cases in 
front of the United States Supreme Court before and during his Senate service, including 
most notably Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).  
 124. 2 WILLIAM HORATIO BARNES, THE FORTIETH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:  
HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL 16 (1870). 
 125. See ALBERT GALLATIN RIDDLE, THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN F. WADE 89 (1888). 
 126. Id. at 109. 
 127. FELIX S. COHEN‘S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 388–89 (Rennard Strickland 
et al. eds., The Michie Company 1982) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter COHEN‘S 
HANDBOOK].   
 128. See Trade and Non-Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161 (1834) (in effect in 1866).  The 
definition of ―Indian Country‖ in contemporary federal law, though much changed from 
what it was during the Treaty era, is directly descended from the definition of the Act.  See 
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 all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within 
the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, 
also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not 
within any state, to which the Indian title has not been extinguished[.]
129
  
Indians dwelling within ―Indian country‖ were ―considered to be 
members of separate political communities and not part of the ordinary 
body politic of the states or of the United States.‖130  
The existence of ―Indian country‖ had profound legal implications for 
the jurisdiction of state and federal governments, courts, and law-
enforcement agencies.  As the standard Indian law reference says, 
―[f]ederal policy from the beginning recognized and protected separate 
status for tribal Indians in their own territory.‖131  In 1866, Indian relations 
were still largely governed by treaties between individual tribes and the 
United States, which treated the tribes as quasi-sovereign and accorded 
tribal members something much like extraterritoriality.132  For example, 
whites could not enter or remain on reservations without permission of the 
United States, buy weapons or hunting items from, or sell them to, tribal 
Indians, or purchase or lease lands from tribal Indians without federal 
permission.133  Foreigners needed both a valid passport and federal 
permission to enter Indian country and were subject to removal if found to 
be attempting to conduct negotiations with tribal governments.134  If tribal 
Indians stole the horses or property of whites—whether the depredation 
occurred on or off the reservation—the aggrieved party had no recourse 
against the thieves but had to apply to the United States to conduct 
diplomatic proceedings with the tribe to obtain recompense and persuade 
the tribe to punish the thieves.135  If negotiations failed, the victim would be 
compensated by the United States, which might then conduct military 
operations against the tribe and apprehend and punish the raiders.136  
Finally, federal criminal statutes governing exclusive federal territory were 
in force within Indian country but did ―not extend to crimes committed by 
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.‖137 
                                                 
COHEN‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 127, at 31.  
 129. Trade and Non-Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161.  
 130. COHEN‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 127, at 641 (footnote omitted). 
 131. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). 
 132. Congress by statute ended the president‘s discretion to enter into formal treaties 
with tribes only in 1871.  COHEN‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 127, at 107. 
 133. Id. at 70, 76, 110. 
 134. Id. at 72, 112, 116. 
 135. Id. at 112, 117. 
 136. Id. at 112. 
 137. Trade and Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 161 (1834).  This remained good law, see Ex 
Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-oa (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883), until the passage of the Major 
Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 385 (1885). 
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Relations with Indians in ―Indian country‖ were, in 1866, governed as 
foreign affairs, subject to the Treaty Power.  Treaties frequently recognized 
the sovereignty of Indian tribes, but numerous treaty provisions also 
attested to their status as dependent nations.138  The fact that much of the 
early relationship between Indians and federal and state governments 
revolved around treaties illustrates that, at least in the first century of the 
United States‘ existence, ―Indian affairs were more an aspect of military 
and foreign policy, than a subject of domestic or municipal law.‖139  In fact, 
the administration of Indian affairs was originally assigned to the 
Department of War.140  It was not until fifty years later that ―all the acts of 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [of the War Department]‖ were 
officially moved to the newly formed Department of the Interior.141 
The confusion over the quasi-sovereign character of tribes also extended 
to the citizenship status of individual Indians.142  Indians typically did not 
acquire citizenship simply by being born within the territory of the United 
States.143  Moreover, prior to the Civil War, ―[n]ative Americans were 
considered to be members of an alien, uncivilized race, whose values were 
antithetical to those of the dominant white civilization.‖144  Chief Justice 
Marshall provided a foundation for denying citizenship to Indians in 
Worcester v. Georgia.145  The opinion implied that Native Americans who 
remained under the authority of tribal governments were citizens of those 
tribes rather than of the United States.146  Professor Earl Maltz has 
suggested that Indians ―were not even appropriately considered part of the 
people of the United States, let alone citizens.‖147  As a result of these 
important legal decisions on the tribes‘ quasi-sovereign status, Indians 
would continue to be excluded from American citizenship.148  
Ten years after Worcester, Chief Justice Taney retreated from Marshall‘s 
theory of Indian citizenship status in United States v. Rogers.149  In the 
opinion, ―Taney seemed to reject the proposition that tribal government 
                                                 
 138. COHEN‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 127, at 393. 
 139. Id. at 393–94 (footnote omitted). 
 140. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7 § 1, 1 Stat. 49. 
 141. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108 § 5, 9 Stat. 395.  
 142. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, 
296–97 (1978). 
 143. Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment and Native American Citizenship, 22 
IMMIGR. & NAT‘LITY L. REV. 625, 630 (2001). 
 144. Id. at 626. 
 145. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Maltz, supra note 143, at 627. 
 148. KETTNER, supra note 142, at 300. 
 149. 45 U.S. 567 (4 How.) (1846). 
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possessed any residual characteristics of sovereignty.‖150  While under 
Taney‘s analysis Indians were still not considered citizens, ―they were 
nonetheless to be considered subjects of the government of the United 
States.‖151  Many Native Americans had no desire whatsoever to become a 
part of and be subject to the rules of white society.152  For those who did, 
naturalization was the only option, and opportunities for naturalization 
were few.153  In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney had supplemented his 
remarks on the ineligibility of black people for citizenship by remarking 
that Indians were not citizens by virtue of the Constitution but that 
Congress could, if it chose, make them citizens by using its naturalization 
power.154 
However, ―a number of treaties and statutes contemplated the possibility 
of Indian citizenship under certain conditions.‖155  Specifically, the 
Cherokee treaties of 1817 and 1819 provided that an Indian who left his 
tribe and received a land allotment in fee simple could thereby become a 
naturalized citizen.156  However, the offer of citizenship often appeared to 
be more of a threat than a reward.157  During the Indian Removal dispute, 
the federal government told the Cherokee that if they did not 
―denationalize‖ and become landholding citizens—thereby giving up their 
highly developed culture—their only alternative was removal west of the 
Mississippi River.158  In the years following, similar treaties were 
                                                 
 150. Maltz, supra note 143, at 627–28. 
 151. Id. at 628. 
 152. Id. at 626. 
 153. See id. at 630 (noting that Native Americans were generally ineligible for 
naturalization under the terms of the naturalization statutes). 
 154. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).  Taney explained: 
It is true that the course of events has brought the Indian tribes within 
the limits of the United States under subjection to the white race; and it 
has been found necessary, for their sake as well as our own, to regard 
them as in a state of pupilage, and to legislate to a certain extent over 
them and the territory they occupy.  But they may, without doubt, like 
the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the 
authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United 
States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up 
his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the 
rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other 
foreign people.  
Id.  
 155. KETTNER, supra note 142, at 291–92. 
 156. See Treaty with the Cherokees, U.S.-Cherokees, art. 8, July 8, 1817, 7 Stat. 156, 
159; Treaty with the Cherokees, U.S.-Cherokees, art. 2, Feb. 27, 1819, 7 Stat. 195, 196. 
 157. See William G. McLoughlin, Experiment in Cherokee Citizenship, 1817–29, 33 AM. 
Q. 3, 4 (1981) (noting that the threats resulted from the government‘s program of requiring 
all Indians east of the Mississippi either to accept removal or to give up their Indian 
identity). 
 158. Id. 
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established between other tribes, often with individual Indians choosing 
between tribal membership (and removal), on the one hand, and American 
citizenship on the other.159  
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, both state and federal 
courts sustained the general view that individual Indians born within tribal 
society did not qualify as citizens by birth.160  This lack of citizenship had a 
significant effect on their ability to convey and inherit real property.161  In 
1823, for example, the New York Court of Errors overturned a lower 
court‘s decision that an Oneida Indian could inherit property as a citizen of 
the State of New York.162  In deciding that the Indian was not a citizen, 
Chancellor James Kent observed:  ―Though born within our territorial 
limits, the Indians are considered as born under the dominion of their 
tribes.  They are not our subjects, born within the purview of the law, 
because they are not born in obedience to us.‖163  In a similar case a few 
years later, the South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the citizenship 
and voting ability of an Indian who had served in the Continental army.164  
Although Marsh was a man of ―excellent character,‖ the judge held ―with 
regret‖ that he was a citizen belonging to that ―race of people, who have 
always been considered as a separate and distinct class, never having been 
incorporated into the body politic.‖165  
Even when a state purchased land from an individual Indian, the 
conveyance was often held void under state law.  Lee v. Glover166 firmly 
established that even in the event that an Indian was granted lands by the 
state as a reward for military services, ―by the constitution and statute law 
of [the State of New York], no white person [could] purchase any title to 
land, from any one or more Indians, either individually or collectively, 
without the authority and consent of the legislature.‖167   
In criminal matters, as one Indian scholar has noted, the trend during the 
years before the Civil War ―was away from a land sovereignty notion of 
jurisdiction and toward a concept based primarily on the citizenship of the 
parties.‖168  The limits on the reach of courts into Indian country were 
                                                 
 159. KETTNER, supra note 142, at 292–93. 
 160. Id. at 294. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. Rep. 693, 734 (N.Y. 1823). 
 163. Id. at 712. 
 164. See State ex rel. Marsh v. Managers of Elections, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 215, 216 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1829); see also KETTNER, supra note 142, at 294–95. 
 165. Marsh, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) at 216. 
 166. 8 Cow. 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828) ) (per curia). 
 167. Id. at 190. 
 168. Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands:  The 
Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV.  951, 955 (1975).   
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based on the idea, present in federal Indian law since Chief Justice 
Marshall‘s opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,169 that Indian tribes 
were not subjects of state authority but ―domestic dependent nations‖ that 
retained important aspects of sovereignty and could in a limited way 
continue to deal with the United States on a state-to-state basis.170  
State law had no reach within Indian Country in 1866.171  That doctrine 
did not begin to erode, even for criminal matters, until at least 1881, with 
the Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. McBratney.172 It was not 
until the Termination Era of the 1950s that Congress by statute extended 
state jurisdiction over Indian reservations—and even then, some 
reservations were exempted.173  As for civil jurisdiction, the question was at 
least equally muddled.174  Even in modern times, as one scholar noted a 
                                                 
 169. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 170. Id. at 17. 
 171. William C. Canby, Jr., Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. 
REV. 206, 207–08 (1973).  
 172. 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (holding that although the federal court did not have 
jurisdiction over a white man accused of murdering another white man on Indian territory, 
the federal authorities were required to turn the accused over to state authorities for 
prosecution).  
 173. See Pub. L. No. 280-505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1953)); see 
also Canby, supra note 171, at 211 (arguing that jurisdiction of tribal courts should be 
determined based on the subject matter of the case and reservation affairs rather than the 
race of the suing party).  
 174. In addition to lack of citizenship and land rights, a brief discussion of criminal 
liability of Indians and criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands is also warranted in 
establishing the legal status of Indians during this time period.  See generally Clinton, supra 
note 168.  Treaties from 1778 to approximately 1796 generally resolved the issue of 
criminal jurisdiction ―through reliance on the Indians‘ sovereignty . . . as well as through 
negotiated arrangements predicated upon the citizenship of the defendant or victim.‖  Id. at 
953.  However, the Treaty of January 9, 1789, also referred to as the Treaty of Fort Harmar, 
marked the beginning of the intrusion of United States jurisdiction into Indian sovereignty.  
See Treaty with the Wyandots, Delawares, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pattawatimas, and Sacs, 
Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28.  This treaty contained language that permitted territorial and state 
governments to prosecute Indians who committed the crimes of robbery and murder against 
non-Indians, regardless of whether the crime was committed in Indian territory.  Id. art. V. 
  The following years witnessed a rapid decrease in Indian sovereignty over criminal 
matters.  Clinton, supra note 168, at 955.  By the mid-1820s, provisions granting tribes 
criminal jurisdiction had all but disappeared.  Id.  Moreover, federal jurisdiction, which had 
previously been limited to situations where the victim was a U.S. citizen, ―was now 
extended to cases in which either the perpetrator or the victim was a citizen or resident of 
the United States.‖  Id.  Thirty years later, the Cherokees agreed to the establishment of a 
federal district court in Indian country.  Id. at 956 (citing Treaty with the Cherokees art. VII, 
U.S.-Cherokees, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799, 800–01 (stipulating that until a federal court 
was created, the closest federal court to the reservation would have jurisdiction).  However, 
the Cherokees insisted that the treaty include a proviso ensuring that they could retain 
exclusive jurisdiction of ―all civil and criminal cases arising within their country in which 
members of the nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only parties.‖  Treaty with the 
Cherokees art. VII, U.S.-Cherokees, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799, 803; see also Clinton, 
supra note 168, at 956–57.  
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century after the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, ―[n]early every 
problem of Indian law has at its core a jurisdictional dispute.‖175  
In short, tribal Indians were a large population resident within United 
States territory.  Over-expansive draftsmanship of the Citizenship Clause 
would have had the unintended effect of making all of them United States 
citizens, voiding numerous treaties and presenting federal courts and law 
enforcement officials with all-but-insuperable problems of adjudication and 
enforcement.  It should hardly be surprising, then, that the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would include language omitting them from the 
declaratory language of the Clause. 
Of course, the Framers could have simply used the ―Indians not taxed‖ 
language.  However, there was one more category of persons inside the 
United States who did not acquire citizenship by birth.  Children born to 
accredited diplomatic personnel, by treaty and by customary international 
law, are not ―subject to the jurisdiction‖ of the receiving state and do not by 
birth become citizens of the United States.  Neither they nor their parents 
can be sued in civil court, state or federal, for individual torts; nor, except 
in extraordinary cases, can they be arrested or tried for alleged crimes in 
American courts.   
It hardly seems coincidental that this class of children is the one that 
everyone agrees the Framers were discussing prior to the segue into the 
discussion of Indians.  In 1866, tribal Indians had some of the same 
characteristics of diplomats.  Their off-reservation raids (like crimes or 
torts committed by diplomatic personnel or families) did not subject them 
to arrest by state authorities, and were in the first instance matters of direct 
government-to-government diplomatic negotiation.  They had a sharply 
limited capacity to enter into contracts, buy and sell property, or sue or be 
sued in court.  Unlike diplomatic personnel, however, tribal Indians were 
and had been since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia considered to be resident 
on American soil and under the national authority of the United States in 
external matters.   
Many thinkers believed in 1866 that the United States could, if it chose, 
extinguish all remnants of Indian sovereignty and reduce tribal Indians to 
the status of subjects of both state and federal jurisdiction.  But it had not 
done so.  The reasons are many, but surely foremost among them was that 
the Indians themselves were in a position to offer violent and effectual 
military resistance to such a move, even against the military behemoth the 
United States had become.  In 1866, the debacle at Little Big Horn was still 
a decade away.  The last battle of the Indian Wars did not take place until 
                                                 
 175. Canby, supra note 171, at 206.  
GARRETT EPPS 60.2 
2010] THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE 369 
 
1918.  American jurisdiction over Indian country might be complete on the 
international plane; but domestically it seemed shaky indeed.  Tribal 
Indians occupied thus a much different position than did, say, Chinese 
living in California.   
If, as I contend, the phrase ―full and complete jurisdiction‖ draws its 
meaning from the context of tribal Indians, it means something 
considerably different than mere dual nationality of parentage, which is the 
meaning that advocates of a restrictive reading claim to discern in it.  Can 
―illegal aliens‖ be arrested, tried, and even executed?  Can ―illegal aliens‖ 
buy and sell property?  Can they make contracts and incur liability for 
breach?  Can they be sued in tort if they, for example, drive unsafely and 
injure or kill other motorists?  The answer to these questions is clear.  In 
short, ―illegal aliens‖ in the twenty-first century have no similarity to tribal 
Indians in the nineteenth.  Their children (unlike the children of tribal 
Indians) do not have, as a matter of American law, another nation upon 
whose protection they may call.  Unlike tribal Indians, they are not 
guaranteed membership in any community other than the one into which 
they are born. 
Proponents of restriction, however, find one flaw in these newborns.  
Not in themselves, actually, but in their parents, who are either lawbreakers 
or at the very least undesirables.  ―Blame the parents,‖ Arizona State 
Senator Russell Pearce said recently.  ―They‘re breaking the law, and you 
can‘t reward them.‖176  But in terms of defining an innocent person‘s legal 
capacity, it is difficult to see what relevance the status of their parents has.  
It may be true that the United States has ―tried‖ to exclude the parents from 
the community by ―discouraging‖ their entry.177  But the children have 
committed no crime at birth; have violated no law; have not transgressed 
the implied promise of a visa.  
To punish babies, much less to proscribe and entirely outlaw them, 
because of the perceived sins of their parents is alien to our moral and 
ethical tradition.  Guilt is not hereditary; it is individual.178  We do not 
                                                 
 176. Scott Wong, Arizona State Sen. Russell Pearce  
Targets Immigrants‘ Kids, POLITICO, (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/40675.html.  
 177. I use the quotation marks because there is a compelling case to be made that, 
because the American economy depends on their labor, efforts to exclude or discourage 
―illegal aliens‖ are in fact ineffectual by design. 
 178. The principle that guilt is not hereditary is a foundational principle of the Western 
moral-legal tradition: 
Yet say ye, Why? doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father? When 
the son hath done that which is lawful and right, and hath kept all my 
statutes, and hath done them, he shall surely live. The soul that sinneth, 
it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall 
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impose legal disabilities on the children of felons, for example, no matter 
how heinous their parents‘ actions.  The conscience revolts at the idea, and 
the Constitution itself rejects ancestral guilt as a basis for policy.  However 
much we dislike undocumented aliens, they are surely not worse than 
traitors, those who ―levy[] [w]ar against [the United States,‖ or ―adher[e] to 
their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.‖179  And yet, even with the 
example of Benedict Arnold fresh in their minds, the Framers of the 
Constitution protected the children of these renegades from eating their 
parents‘ sour grapes:  ―[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.‖180  
To argue that American-born children are in some way not ―subject to 
the jurisdiction‖ of the United States is not to argue that they benefit in 
some way from the immunities of extraterritoriality; it is to argue that they 
suffer all the liabilities of citizenship but are, because of actions of a third 
party, to be deprived of its advantages.  Does it seem likely that the anti-
slavery thinkers who devised the Citizenship Clause as a means of 
overruling Dred Scott intended at the same time to create a new class of 
persons who had no rights a citizen is bound to respect?  
IV. THE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP 
Citizenship Without Consent centers around a sophisticated reading of 
such Enlightenment figures as John Locke, Emmerich de Vatel, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui.  The thought of these 
figures, as ably construed by the authors, gives substance to their 
contention that  
birthright citizenship is something of a bastard concept in American 
ideology.  For all its appealing simplicity, it remains a puzzling idea. . . . 
[I]t was fundamentally opposed to the consensual assumptions that 
guided the political handiwork of 1776 and 1787.  In a polity whose 
chief organizing principle was and is the liberal, individualistic idea of 
consent, mere birth within a nation‘s border seems to be an anomalous, 
inadequate measure or expression of an individual‘s consent to its rule 
and a decidedly crude indicator of the nation‘s consent to the 
individual‘s admission to political membership.
181
 
                                                 
the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous 
shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. 
Ezekiel 18:19–20 (King James). 
 179. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.  I thank Professor Laurence Claus of the University 
of San Diego for pointing this out to me.   
 180. Id. cl. 2. 
 181. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
GARRETT EPPS 60.2 
2010] THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE 371 
 
This analysis is admirable.  But as it says, it applies the intellectual 
concepts of ―1776 and 1787‖ to construe a constitutional amendment 
written in 1866.  It implicitly assumes that the American conception of 
citizenship underwent no changes during eight decades of convulsive 
political struggle that culminated in a catastrophic Civil War and a 
constitutional revolution.  And the elegant references to Burlamaqui and 
Vattel disguise the absence of any parsing of the more immediate 
intellectual background of the Amendment.   
In fact, the index to Citizenship Without Consent contains no entries for 
the more relevant figures.  Not only is there no reference to important 
nineteenth-century figures like Wendell Phillips, Francis Lieber, Edward 
Bates, Robert Dale Owen and Carl Schurz; there is no mention even of 
some of the immediate legislative forebears of the Fourteenth Amendment 
generally and the Citizenship Clause generally—names like John Bingham, 
Thaddeus Stevens, William P. Fessenden, and Benjamin Wade.  Even those 
who are mentioned—figures like Senator Lyman Trumbull and Jacob 
Howard—are quoted only as to their remarks in the legislative debates, 
with no attempt to place their remarks in the context of their own thought 
or of the debate of their times.  In short, without seeming to notice, the 
authors (and those whose interpretations depend on their work) make two 
fundamental interpretive errors.  First, they insist on interpreting a 
nineteenth-century enactment exclusively in terms of eighteenth-century 
ideas; second, they treat an amendment to the Constitution, written in a 
time of revolutionary upheaval, as if it made either no change or at most 
only minimal change in the document it was amending.  The result is an 
ahistorical and perverse reading of phrases whose meaning becomes far 
clearer when considered in their actual context.182  
                                                 
 182. In his subsequent intellectual history of American citizenship, Professor Smith 
notes that ―[m]any have objected to our argument [in Citizenship Without Consent], and 
some of the objections have force.‖  ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:  CONFLICTING 
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 309 (1997).  Nonetheless, he argues that permitting 
citizenship only to children of aliens lawfully present in the United States ―produces the 
main results most framers endorsed:  constitutional inclusion for blacks and permanent 
resident aliens like the Chinese, but no such inclusion for the tribes.‖  Id.  This argument is 
of a type that appears in some ―originalist‖ writings from at least the time of Dred Scott.  
Since we know what the Framers were thinking, it suggests, we can interpret their words to 
mean what they were thinking rather than what they said.  The language of the Clause does 
not support a limitation to ―blacks and resident aliens.‖  Professor Smith explains the 
language by interpreting the legislative debates to say that Trumbull and Howard ―stress[ed] 
that the clause implicitly required ‗full and complete‘ jurisdiction.  Insofar as they clarified 
what that meant, however, they identified it with a lack of any divided political allegiance.‖  
Id.  This summary flatly mischaracterizes what was said.  Trumbull and Howard did clarify 
what they meant:  full subjection to the jurisdiction of United States courts. 
  The phrase ―[i]nsofar as they clarified what that meant‖ is of a type that often 
appears in ―originalist‖ writings.  It has a good deal of utility as a means of discounting 
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Simply put, both American legal history and the intellectual history of 
the antislavery movement produced a rich body of material reformulating 
the idea of American citizenship—one that makes an inclusive reading of 
the Clause much more plausible and a restrictive one anomalous.  In the 
area of legal history, another comprehensive survey of antebellum 
citizenship law concludes that birthright citizenship was the legal norm in 
American law during the first half of the nineteenth century.183  While 
Schuck and Smith suggest that American law was ambivalent between 
―ascriptive‖ (birthright) citizenship and a consensual model, James H. 
Kettner concludes that birthright citizenship was an unquestioned principle 
of American law until the slavery controversy drove pro-slavery jurists to 
construct an alternative model of citizenship that could exclude American-
born black people on the ground that the polity did not ―consent‖ to their 
membership.184  Before 1820, he writes,  
Americans merely continued to assume that ―birth within the allegiance‖ 
conferred [citizenship] and its accompanying rights.  Natives were 
presumably educated from infancy in the values and habits necessary for 
self-government, and there was no need to worry about their 
qualifications for membership.  To be sure, it might trouble some that the 
volitional, consensual character of birthright citizenship was in fact more 
theoretical than real owing to the lack of concrete legislation regulating 
the abstract right of expatriation; but this concern only led to agitation 
for laws that would allow citizens to withdraw from membership.  It did 
not shake the presumption that membership was acquired automatically 
by all those born under the Republic.
185
   
As late as 1838, for example, one North Carolina court wrote that a freed 
slave must be a citizen, because ―[s]laves manumitted here became 
freemen—and therefore if born within North Carolina are citizens of North 
Carolina—and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the 
State.‖186  In Kettner‘s account, the rule of citizenship by birth was the 
orthodox legal view.  The sustained critique of birthright citizenship was 
the novel doctrine.  Kettner writes that it was advanced by state courts and 
lawyers anxious to justify and legalize the removal and exclusion of Native 
                                                 
adverse authority gleaned from the statements of the very framers a conscientious 
―originalist‖ purports to be following.  It is akin to the suggestion that seemingly clear text 
must be unclear.  The framers, it turned out, were confused.  They did not really know what 
they were ―intending.‖  Thus subsequent scholars, who understand theory better, can by a 
kind of substituted judgment create their actual intent, whether they would have claimed it 
or not. 
 183. See KETTNER, supra note 142, at 287. 
 184. Id. at 287–88.   
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 317 (quoting State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (4 Dev. & Bat.) 20, 25 (1838)). 
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Americans and the permanent subordination of slaves and free blacks.187  
That effort at doctrinal change bore fruit in the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Scott v. Sandford, a decision that was seen as extreme at the time and takes 
little account of the weight of legal authority that favored birthright 
citizenship. 
In fact, many American lawyers and lawmakers would have seen the 
Citizenship Clause as merely a declaration of what the law already was.  
Schuck and Smith seem to be interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as if 
it had been written as a slight modification of cases like Dred Scott, rather 
than being designed to overturn them.  It is as if interpreters were to read 
the United States Constitution as in some way a reaffirmation of the British 
Constitution, ―intended‖ to make only minimal changes in British 
sovereignty over North America and the absolute sovereignty of 
Parliament.  The Fourteenth Amendment is an amendment.  A contextual 
history of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that it was 
intended as a wide-ranging and fundamental change in the 1787 
Constitution, not as a minor technical change leaving core concepts 
unchanged. 
As noted above, my research to date has focused on the political ideas 
and debate immediately surrounding the adoption of the Amendment.  
Excellent scholars have delved more deeply than I into the general 
intellectual history of anti-slavery ideas during the forty years preceding 
the Civil War.188  Even a cursory dip into their work and the documentary 
sources surrounding it produces God‘s plenty of evidence that, by 1865, the 
idea of citizenship had undergone a radical shift from the half-hearted, 
state-centered view enshrined in the original Constitution.   
Jacobus tenBroek, one of the pioneers of modern Fourteenth 
Amendment scholarship, sets out his thesis early in his book Equal Under 
Law:  ―In some ways doctrinally and perhaps historically the most 
significant contribution made by the abolitionists in the constitutional 
development of the United States was their conception of paramount 
                                                 
 187. KETTNER, supra note 142, at 288.   
 188. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986)(arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment manifested their intent that the states were required to respect individual 
liberties in the privileges and immunities clause); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT:  FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988)(discussing the 
philosophical development and academic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
the time of adoption to present day); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (Collier 
Books 1965) (1951), originally published as THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (examining the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment and debate 
surrounding it to prove that a broad protection of civil rights was what the drafters 
intended).   
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national citizenship.‖189  This ―paramount‖ notion took the idea of 
citizenship firmly out of the hands of the states.  An American citizen, 
whether ―natural born‖ or naturalized, was a citizen of the United States; 
citizenship arose out of the nation, under the Constitution, rather than as a 
derivative boon arising out of state citizenship.  The paramount idea was 
also strikingly inclusive.  It regarded birth itself as sufficient for 
citizenship, and saw membership in the American family as a right of the 
child‘s quite independent of the qualities of his or her parents. 
tenBroek cites Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany as the ―principal 
spokesmen and most articulate exponents of the theory of paramount 
national citizenship.‖190  Spooner‘s 1845 tract, The Unconstitutionality of 
Slavery,191 is concerned to prove that the guarantees of liberty in the 
Constitution applied to those then held as slaves:  ―The constitution [sic] of 
the United States recognizes the principle that all men are born free; for it 
recognizes the principle that natural birth in the country gives citizenship—
which of course implies freedom.  And no exception is made to the rule.‖192 
Spooner further argues that in American usage since the Revolution, the 
word ―free person‖ and ―citizen‖ are synonymous.  Being born free, 
Spooner argued, those held as slaves are citizens by birth, regardless of any 
reluctance on the part of slave states to acknowledge their membership in 
the political community. (Note that this argument for slave citizenship 
antedates the Supreme Court‘s decision in Dred Scott, and thus can hardly 
be regarded as an ad hoc response to it.)   
The basic argument for slave citizenship arises out of the Constitution‘s 
requirement that any individual elected President must be ―a natural born 
citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this 
Constitution.‖193  This language, Spooner says,  
is an implied assertion that natural birth in the country gives the right of 
citizenship.  And if it gives it to one, it necessarily gives it to all—for no 
discrimination is made; and if all persons born in the country, are not 
entitled to citizenship, the constitution has given us no test by which to 
determine who of them are entitled to it.
194
   
Spooner then confronts directly the eighteenth-century argument, carried 
on by Schuck and Smith, that mere birth slights the requirement of consent: 
                                                 
 189. TENBROEK, supra note 188, at 94. 
 190. Id. at 108.   
 191. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1845). 
 192.  Id. at 156 (footnote omitted).  
 193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.   
 194. SPOONER, supra note 191, at 119. 
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It may, perhaps, be argued that the slaves were not parties to the 
constitution, inasmuch as they never, in fact, consented to it.  But this 
reasoning would disfranchise half the population; for there is not a single 
constitution in the country—state, or national—to which one half of the 
people who are, in theory, parties to it, ever, in fact and in form, agreed.  
Voting for and under a constitution, are almost the only acts that can, 
with any reason at all, be considered a formal assent to a constitution.  
Yet a bare majority of the adult males, or about one tenth of the whole 
people, is the largest number of ―the people― that has ever been 
considered necessary, in this country, to establish a constitution.  And 
after it is established, only about one fifth of the people are allowed to 
vote under it, even where suffrage is most extended.  So that no formal 
assent to a constitution is ever given by the people at large.  Yet the 
constitutions themselves assume, and virtually assert, that all ―the 
people― have agreed to them.  They must, therefore, be construed on the 
theory that all have agreed to them, else the instruments themselves are 
at once denied, and, of course, invalidated altogether.  No one, then, who 
upholds the validity of the constitution, can deny its own assertion, that 
all ―the people― are parties to it.  
. . . . 
The consent, then, of ―the people― at large is presumed, whether they 
ever have really consented, or not.  Their consent is presumed only on 
the assumption that the rights of citizenship are valuable and beneficial 
to them, and that if they understood that fact, they would willingly give 
their consent in form.
195
 
Joel Tiffany, in his A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of American 
Slavery,196 asserted that persons of African descent born in the United 
States were in fact citizens even though their parents, brought here as 
slaves after the Revolution, were not eligible for naturalization; the fact of 
birth in the United States was enough.  His analysis specifically sets out a 
definition for determining when a child is ―subject to a foreign power,‖ a 
phrase that is crucial to the ―originalist‖ argument.  The Naturalization Act, 
he writes 
does not exclude from the benefits of citizenship those colored persons 
who, prior to [its passage] had ceased to be aliens either to the National 
or State Governments.  Neither does it affect the rights of those who 
were born within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government and who 
consequently, never were aliens, and stand in no need of naturalization; 
                                                 
 195. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 184–85 (enlarged ed. 
1860) (1845). 
 196. JOEL TIFFANY, TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY:  
TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO 
THAT SUBJECT (Mnemosyne Publishing Co. 1969) (1849). 
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and inasmuch as all are citizens or natural born subjects, who are not 
aliens, hence all colored persons, who are born in the United States, 
whether their parents are citizens or aliens, become citizens by birth; and 
there is no Constitutional power any where, to declare or treat them as 
aliens.  They are not born under the protection of any foreign power, and 
they owe no allegience [sic] to any; consequently they cannot be 
required to take any oath of renunciation of allegience [sic].
197
 
As tenBroek suggests, these theories arising out of the anti-slavery 
movement had an influence on practical politicians as well as on political 
activists.  tenBroek himself appends a lengthy 1857 speech by 
Representative John Bingham, who a decade later was one of the most 
important forces in the drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Bingham speech is important because it makes clear that 
the anti-slavery idea of birthright citizenship was not a wooly rhetorical 
notion.  Bingham, an accomplished lawyer, in fact is delivering his view of 
birthright citizenship within the context of an extremely restrictive view of 
the political rights of non-citizens.   
The occasion was the proposed admission of the Oregon Territory to the 
Union under a constitution written by white Oregonians at a convention in 
Salem, Oregon, in 1857.  Bingham strenuously objected to two distinct 
provisions of the draft constitution, and both objections were informed by 
his view of the national nature of citizenship.  The first provision permitted 
white immigrants who were not naturalized citizens to take up residence in 
the new state and exercise full voting rights; the second proclaimed it 
illegal for ―free Negroes or mulattoes‖ to enter or remain within the state at 
any time.198  Bingham regarded both as unconstitutional, one because it 
was too inclusive and the other because it was too exclusive.  
Bingham sets the stage of his two objections with a defense of birthright 
citizenship that directly addresses the Schuck and Smith notion of 
―ascription‖ as a remnant of medieval subjection:  
Who are the citizens of the United States?  Sir, they are those, and those 
only, who owe allegiance to the Government of the United States; not 
the base allegiance imposed upon the Saxon by the Conqueror, which 
required him to meditate in solitude and darkness at the sound of the 
curfew; but the allegiance which requires the citizen not only to obey, 
but to support and defend, if need be with his life, the Constitution of his 
country.  All free persons born and domiciled within the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
 197. Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
 198. This language of course became legally inoperative upon the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
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the United States, are citizens of the United States from birth; all aliens 
become citizens of the United States only by act of naturalization . . . .
199
   
Of extending the vote to aliens, even those who had entered the 
naturalization process, Bingham said,  
The Constitution very clearly imports that only persons born here or 
naturalized by law are citizens of the United States . . . . [C]itizens of the 
United States are the free inhabitants, born and domiciled with in the 
United states, or naturalized under the laws thereof, and that these alone 
are citizens, and when resident within the several States, constitute the 
body politic . . . .
200
 
As for the exclusion of ―free Negroes and mulattoes,‖ Bingham said, 
the persons thus excluded from the State by this section of the Oregon 
constitution, are citizens by birth of the several States, and therefore are 
citizens of the United States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .  
. . . .  
All free persons, then, born and domiciled in any State of the Union, are 
citizens of the United States . . . .  
. . . .  
It is, sir, the public law of the civilized world, that every free man is 
entitled to live in the land of his birth.
201
 
In short, Bingham‘s theory of citizenship was a specifically republican 
one, drawing on the egalitarian ideology of nineteenth century liberalism 
and specifically distinguishing itself from the medieval ascriptive concept 
of subjection.  It was a definition that insisted on a sharp distinction 
between the rights of aliens and those of citizens; and it was a definition 
that insisted the only prerequisite for ―natural born‖ citizenship was legal 
freedom at birth.  The definition specifically rejected the idea that 
citizenship could be further limited by ―conventional‖ restrictions on 
―political rights‖ such as the right to vote or hold office.   
The paramount theory of national citizenship by right of birth, in fact, 
was by 1866 an important part of the legal as well as the intellectual 
background of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Of all the sources omitted by 
those favoring a restrictive reading of the Citizenship Clause, none is quite 
so adverse to their position as that of the opinion by Edward Bates, 
Lincoln‘s Attorney General, on the citizenship of free black sailors engaged 
                                                 
 199. John A. Bingham, The Constitution of the United States and the Proslavery 
Provisions of the 1857 Oregon Constitution (1859), reprinted in TENBROEK, supra note 188, 
at 320, 327 (emphasis added).  The speech is being made after Dred Scott but well before 
the Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 200. Id. at 330. 
 201. Id. at 336–41. 
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in the coasting trade.202  That opinion, rendered in 1862, represented the 
legal position of the United States at the time of the framing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; it is hard to argue that it is not a salient part of the 
legal background.  In the opinion, Bates responded to a request from 
Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase for an answer to a practical question:  
―Are colored men citizens of the United States, and therefore competent to 
command American vessels?‖203 
Bates drew on the theories of Spooner and Tiffany to answer that 
citizenship was the property of all persons born in the United States: 
As far as I know, Mr. Secretary, you and I have no better title to the 
citizenship which we enjoy than ―the accident of birth‖—the  fact that 
we happened to be born in the United States.  And our Constitution, in 
speaking of natural-born citizens, uses no affirmative language to make 
them such, but only recognizes and reaffirms the universal principle, 
common to all nations, and as old as political society, that the people 
born in a country do constitute the nation, and, as individuals, are natural 
members of the body politic.  
If this be a true principle, and I do not doubt it, it follows that every 
person born in the country is, at the moment of birth, prima facie a 
citizen; and he who would deny it must take upon himself the burden of 
proving some great disfranchisement strong enough to override the 
―natural born‖ right as recognized by the Constitution in terms the most 
simple and comprehensive, and without any reference to race or color, or 
any other accidental circumstance.
204
 
Bates admitted only one established exception to this rule:  ―the small 
and admitted class of the natural born composed of the children of foreign 
ministers and the like.‖205  As for slaves, he explicitly refused to endorse 
the generally understood rule, derived from Dred Scott, that children of 
slaves were not citizens, ―because it is not within the scope of your 
inquiry.‖206  In addition, he was at pains to make clear a second point 
relevant to the current inquiry:  that a child‘s citizenship is not created by 
the legal status of his or her parents.  ―It is an error to suppose that 
citizenship is ever hereditary.  It never ‗passes by descent.‘  It is as original 
in the child as it was in his parents.  It is always either born with him or 
given to him directly by law.‖207 
                                                 
 202. Citizenship, 10 OP. ATT‘Y. GEN. 382 (1862).  
 203. Id. at 383 (emphasis in original). 
 204. Id. at 394. 
 205. Id. at 397. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 399. 
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Bates turned to the issue of ―ascription‖ vs. ―consent‖ by referring to a 
previous opinion, by former Attorney General William Wirt, that ―free 
persons of color‖ residing in Virginia were not citizens of the United 
States.208  Wirt‘s opinion had in part rested on the proposition that ―[t]he 
allegiance which the free man of color owes to the State of Virginia is no 
evidence of citizenship, for he owes it not in consequence of an oath of 
allegiance.‖209  Bates wrote,  
This proposition surprises me; perhaps I do not understand it.  I did 
verily believe that the oath of allegiance was not the cause but the 
sequence of citizenship, given only as a solemn guarantee for the 
performance of duties already incurred.  But, if it be true that the oath of 
allegiance must either create or precede citizenship, then it follows, of 
necessity, that there can be no natural-born citizens, as the Constitution 
affirms, because the child must be born before it can take the oath.
210
 
A proper consideration of nineteenth century political thought—the 
thought that formed the real background of the Framing of the Citizenship 
Clause—furnishes strong evidence that the restrictive thesis, based on 
Locke and other Enlightenment thinkers, is at best implausible.  Readily 
available evidence suggests that the thinkers who guided the Framing saw 
birthright citizenship as the norm, with the sole exception being children of 
diplomats—that they saw this as the state of affairs before the ratification 
of the Amendment, which made explicit a fact they believed to be already 
present in the Constitution.  Readily available evidence suggests that this 
view was not ambivalent, ill-thought-out, or crudely based on medieval 
norms.  It represented the fruit of the most advanced progressive social 
thought available to Americans in the year 1866.   
The act of the Framing was embedded in a history, and a set of ideas, 
from which we pluck it at our peril.  Those who would so isolate it from 
context must furnish a justification for that choice—one that is 
conspicuously missing from the ―originalist‖ scholarship on this subject. 
V. BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES 
We have looked at the legislative debates surrounding the adoption of 
the Clause.  They do not support a restrictive reading of the Clause.  We 
have examined the legal background of the framing; the framing generation 
gave almost no weight to the questions of ―consensualism,‖ and the polity‘s 
right to exclude, that Schuck and Smith and others consider crucial. 
                                                 
 208. Id. at 400 (1862) (discussing Rights of Free Virginia Negroes, 1 OP. ATT‘Y. GEN. 
506, 509 (1821)).  
 209. Free Virginia Negros, supra note 208, at 508. 
 210. Citizenship, supra note 202, at 403.  
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Two more arguments underlie the case for the restrictive reading.  The 
first is that circumstances have changed; that the Framers could not have 
foreseen the unprecedented circumstances of America‘s immigration crisis.  
The second is one of constitutional policy.  One of the arguments against 
birthright citizenship, remember, is that it is an ―anomaly,‖ contrary to the 
spirit of the Constitution, and that it threatens democratic legitimacy by 
forcing the polity to absorb the children of persons whom the majority has 
made clear it does not want.  
The first argument has two parts:  first, that as in 1866 there was no such 
legal category as ―illegal immigrant,‖211 the Framers could not have 
intended the Clause to apply to their children.  As a matter of historical 
lexicography, this claim is hard to gainsay.  But the lexicographical 
argument is simple-minded; it is akin to arguing that the Air Force is 
contrary to the Framers‘ intent because they only authorized an Army and a 
Navy.   
The more sophisticated argument would be that there was nothing like an 
―illegal alien‖ at the time of the Framing.  As a matter of historical analogy, 
that argument rests on dubious reasoning.  The debates about the Civil 
Rights Act and the Citizenship Clause specifically address the situations of 
two different groups who might be considered to share the core 
characteristics of ―illegal aliens.‖ 
The central concerns of advocates of immigration restrictionists 
prominently include, first, that ―illegal aliens‖ in their presence and their 
conduct constitute a threat to the American system of law.  They have 
come here without permission (or have remained after temporary 
permission has expired); they live here in defiance not only of entry 
restrictions but in evasion of domestic laws.212  They constitute a 
population that has deliberately chosen not to become part of the American 
system and that thus threatens the very American idea of assimilation.   
                                                 
 211. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 212. One common claim made about illegal aliens is that they ―pay no taxes‖ and that 
they consume taxpayer dollars by accessing ―welfare programs‖; in fact, most ―illegal‖ 
workers who remain here do so because they are working or their family members are 
working to support them.  See Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented 
Immigrants:  Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 
1–8 (2006) (compiling several studies demonstrating the misguided nature of American 
attitudes toward the financial cost of ―illegal‖ immigration).  In addition, many of these 
workers pay more taxes than comparable legal workers because they can never expect to 
receive the income-tax refunds and Social Security benefits they are paying for.  Id.  As for 
the generous ―welfare programs‖ that aliens access, I am still trying to figure out what they 
are.  The single exception I am aware of lies in combined private, state and federal programs 
that provide reimbursement to hospital emergency rooms that must treat uninsured patients.  
This is not an inconsiderable cost, but one that could arguably be better addressed by a 
program of universal health care rather than by doing violence to the Constitution. 
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But as noted above, two groups that featured in the debates actually give 
us a very good gauge of what the Framers thought about these issues:  
children of Chinese workers and children of Gypsies.  The Chinese, who 
had been present in large numbers in California and the West since the 
California Gold Rush of 1849, were barred from naturalization under the 
―white-only‖ terms of the Naturalization Act of 1790.  Their presence in 
the United States was ―legal‖ within the crude boundaries of antebellum 
immigration law, but they were not eligible for citizenship no matter how 
long or productive their residence in the United States.  They were most 
particularly ―subject to a foreign power‖ in that they remained subjects of 
the Chinese Empire; they were resented and opposed as competition with 
native-born citizens for laboring jobs in the goldfield and on the railroads; 
and they were the subject of an explicit and pointed refusal by the polity to 
grant its consent to their membership in the body politic. 
Nonetheless, as noted above, the sponsors of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, when asked in clear terms about this case, were unwavering 
in their insistence that the Citizenship Clause was to cover their children.  
As an example of the Framers‘ attitudes toward the children of those the 
polity spurns, this flat certainty is powerfully suggestive.  Restrictive-
reading proponents are harshly critical of the Supreme Court‘s 1898 
decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark213 that American-born children 
of Chinese immigrants are American citizens; but simply as a matter of 
reading the ―intent‖ of the drafters, it seems unexceptionable. 
The second example, of the Gypsies, is equally suggestive.  Remember 
Senator Cowan‘s description of these people as interlopers ―who recognize 
no authority in [Pennsylvania‘s] government; who have a distinct, 
independent government of their own—an imperium in imperio; who pay 
no taxes; who never perform military service; who do nothing, in fact, 
which becomes the citizen.‖214  The reference to Gypsy people in the 
debates was far from random.  Opponents of the Civil Rights Act and of the 
proposed Fourteenth Amendment had fixed on the specter of Gypsy 
citizenship in a way that eerily prefigures the contemporary Washington 
practice of generating hypothetical disasters as ―talking points‖ in public 
policy debates.  The idea of ―the people called Gipsies[sic]‖ as a menace 
was specifically evoked by Andrew Johnson in his message vetoing the 
Civil Rights Act.215 
                                                 
 213. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 214. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890–91 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan). 
 215. Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Rights Bill (Mar. 27, 1866), in THE POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 74, 
74–78 (Edward McPherson ed., Negro Universities Press 1969) (1875). 
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It is thus ahistorical to suggest that the Framers did not foresee the legal 
and social characteristics of what we today call ―illegal‖ or 
―undocumented‖ immigrants.  They did; and they rather categorically 
stated that these characteristics—ineligibility for citizenship, 
unacceptability as members of the body politic, isolation from American 
culture and systematic evasion of American law—would not constitute 
exceptions to the Amendment‘s grant of birthright citizenship. 
The second argument is one of scale.  Writing thirty years ago, Schuck 
and Smith note that estimates of illegal immigration range between 3 and 
6.5 million as of 1980.  ―This reality and the fears that it has generated 
concerning its economic and social effects have transformed political 
discourse about American immigration policy in ways that neither 
[nineteenth-century courts] nor the Reconstruction Framers of the 
Citizenship Clause could have anticipated.‖216  The absolute number of 
―illegal‖ aliens present in the United States today is obviously greater.  Five 
years ago, a sophisticated estimate placed the number at 10.3 million.217  As 
noted above, the presence of these immigrants (more than half of whom 
come from Mexico218) constitutes a profound challenge to existing 
American institutions and norms, and has generated and continues to 
generate social change across the country. 
That argument is strongly echoed today by writers such as Charles 
Wood, who writes,  
The very ambiguity of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the 
census and birthright citizenship issues stems in large part from the fact 
that, at the time the Amendment was drafted in 1866, there was no such 
person as an illegal alien.  Today, however, the number of illegal aliens 
is conservatively estimated at five million . . . .
219
 
Each generation imagines that its problems are different from those of all 
who have come before.  We have no idea what America will look like in 
2110; but we do know that the United States of 1866 survived to become 
the United States of 2010.  It seems, then, that the changes they faced were 
less wrenching than those we face.  They were guaranteed a happy ending; 
it is right there in the history textbook.   
But that is a cast of mind, not a historical conclusion.  America in 1866 
was a nation as profoundly transformed by immigration as it is in 2010.  
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Issues of language, culture, religion, social mores and other aspects of the 
American identity were as salient then as they were now.  We would be 
making a profound historical error to imagine that the generation that 
framed the Clause was unaware that migration was a transformative and 
often destabilizing force in American society. 
Simply as one fact, consider that during the Civil War years alone, the 
United States population increased by four million people—most them 
immigrants.  That represented eleven percent of the population in 1866, 
when the Fourteenth Amendment debate took place.220  Foreign-born 
soldiers accounted for 20 percent of the Union Army‘s total strength during 
the war221—an edge in numbers that, coupled with the enlistment of 
thousands of native-born black soldiers, gave the Union the edge of victory.   
The explosion in foreign-born Americans was, however, not a wartime 
phenomenon:  In 1850, the percentage of the U.S. population that was 
foreign born was 9.7 percent.  By 1860, it was 13.2 percent, even before the 
influx noted above.222  How does that compare with our situation today?  
The most recent census estimate places it at 12.4 percent.223  In other 
words, Americans in 1866, particularly those in the North, were at least as 
aware of immigration as we are today, when the issue is central to the 
domestic policy debate.   
Further, the ongoing debate about assimilation of new immigrant 
populations—along with persistent fears that whichever group is entering 
the U.S. most recently brings with it new and insoluble differences of 
language, culture and loyalty—is quite literally as old as the Republic.  The 
very first ―national security‖ crisis in the American Republic—the ―Quasi 
War‖ with France—sparked a panic that French immigrants were 
subversive, disloyal, and unassimilable.224  Similar strains of nativism 
resounded through the national debate from that moment until the end of 
the Civil War.   
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Much of the formation of the infant Republican Party consisted of an 
attempt to marry the anti-slavery and anti-immigrant sentiments of much of 
the Midwestern and New England population with the free-labor loyalties 
of the immigrants themselves.  Many important figures in the anti-slavery 
movement and the Republican Party were themselves immigrants, and a 
number of them played an important role in the intellectual ferment that 
produced the Fourteenth Amendment.  Francis Lieber, the German-born 
social scientist, was the first figure publicly to suggest that the Constitution 
must be remodeled at the end of the Civil War, and his proposed 
amendments bear a distinct paternal resemblance to the eventual result.225  
Carl Schurz, a confidant of Lincoln, was a native of Germany and a key 
figure in refuting the claims of American nativists that the influx of 
European immigrants in the 1840s and 1850s should be combated by legal 
restrictions.  His official report from the defeated South was an important 
part of setting the stage for the Fourteenth Amendment.226  Robert Dale 
Owen, the influential radical who served in Congress and was a member of 
Lincoln‘s wartime American Freedmens Inquiry Commission, was a 
naturalized citizen; he was the author, among other things, of the first draft 
of what emerged from the Joint Committee on Reconstruction as the 
―omnibus amendment‖ that became the Fourteenth Amendment.227  Senator 
John Conness, whose discussion of the citizenship of American-born 
children of Chinese immigrants is a key part of the record, was himself an 
immigrant from Ireland.228 
In short, the idea that the Framers lived in a simpler world, that they 
could not have intended their handiwork to apply to a chaotic, multicultural 
America, does not pass the most superficial historical scrutiny.   
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CONCLUSION:  CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP 
The final argument, as noted above, is one of constitutional policy.  Is it 
a bad idea to extend birthright citizenship to all children born in the United 
States?  Is it anomalous, undemocratic, or in some other way not in keeping 
with the underlying ideas of the Constitution?  Does it portend the 
swamping or destruction of the American identity under a wave of alien 
invaders?  
As I (and Schuck and Smith) have said, it may in fact have been 
anomalous to have a birthright rule in the republic set up by the 
Constitution of 1787.  Much of the social theory we have absorbed to 
understand that document—an eighteenth century confederation of smaller, 
quasi-sovereign, elite-dominated ―Atlantic republics‖—rebels at the idea of 
uncritical inclusiveness, whether for purposes of citizenship, voting, or the 
exercise of basic civil rights.   
But just as ―we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are 
expounding,‖229 we must also never forget that the Fourteenth Amendment 
is not the Fourteenth Reaffirmation. It is an amendment we are construing, 
one written by different Framers with nineteenth, not eighteenth, century 
views.  They were willing to undertake the desperate political struggle 
required for an amendment because they perceived that the original 
Constitution had failed catastrophically.  That catastrophic failure, 
moreover, was directly related to the issue of inclusion and exclusion in the 
body politic.  The split between the sections was a dispute over the proper 
place in the national life of a population of persons of African descent.  
One side gradually came to believe that they were, and always had been, 
citizens within the correct meaning of the Constitution; the other insisted 
that they were never and could never be citizens, that they were a 
permanently inferior caste whose proper role was to serve the 
Constitution‘s true beneficiaries.  The direct and immediate purpose of the 
Citizenship Clause was to take the latter doctrine out of American law, 
where it had been written by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. Sandford.   
One of the most striking things about contemporary interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is its resolute unwillingness to confront the 
Amendment as a textual and conceptual whole.  The standard method of 
interpretation, which a number of proponents of a restrictive reading of the 
Clause employ, is to disaggregate the Amendment, ignore all sections but 
the first, and then consider each phrase separately.  It is as if the Framers 
are thought to have enacted a grocery list, randomly including milk, eggs, 
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flour, sugar, butter, baking powder, and vanilla flavoring.  We could take 
each ingredient, research its significance in Western history, and then 
conclude that they have been jammed together randomly.  But wouldn‘t it 
make more sense to consider it as a recipe for, say, a cake, in which each 
ingredient is to contribute something to the others?   
Elsewhere I have suggested that the aim of the Amendment—deducible 
from its text and from the circumstances of its adoption—was to replace 
the loose confederation of exclusive republics with a nation that would 
finally redeem the promise of James Madison‘s decidedly un-Atlantic idea 
of an ―extended republic,‖230 comprehending a diversity of interests and 
passions, to create a society in which popular participation and the rights of 
political minorities would be protected from majoritarian oppression.   
The 1787 Constitution, in the view of the Amendment‘s Framers, had 
signally failed to realize the advantages Madison foresaw.  Instead, it had 
allowed the Southern states to create quasi-sovereign dictatorships in which 
Madison‘s nightmare231 came true:  ―Men of factious tempers, of local 
prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by 
other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interest of the 
people.‖232  As the anti-slavery Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment saw 
it, the ―lords of the lash‖ had (with the connivance of the federal 
government) made themselves oligarchs and used their influence on the 
nation to subject the free population to the designs and ambitions of the 
Slave Power.233   
A major tool of the Slave Power had been state control over citizenship, 
and insistence that human equality had no role to play in American life.  
Economic, social and political life depended upon the existence of a large, 
permanently subordinated class of non-citizens who could be exploited to 
produce wealth.  The Citizenship Clause took this option away not only 
from the local elites but from the nation as a whole.  From its enactment 
forward, the United States would be what the German American 
immigrants‘ rights advocate Carl Schurz called ―the republic of equal 
rights, where the title of manhood is the title to citizenship.‖234  
Citizenship was to be extended to all—not out of grace, but as a means 
of protecting the nation from those who would reinvent the Slave Power.  
Only radical civic equality could prevent the re-emergence of local 
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oligarchy and systems of exploitation.  Walt Whitman, who thought as 
deeply as any American about the causes and impact of the Civil War, 
wrote in its aftermath that ―[o]f all dangers to a nation, as things exist in 
our day, there can be no greater one than having certain portions of the 
people set off from the rest by a line drawn—they not privileged as others, 
but degraded, humiliated, made of no account.‖235 
And if that view is valid, there is an alarming irony in the proposition 
that the United States should alter its constitutional system to create a large 
internal population of native-born non-citizens, a hereditary subordinate 
caste of persons who are subjected to American law but do not belong to 
American society.  To one with a historical memory, the new proposed 
status, supposedly implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment, looks very much 
like an old status that was supposedly cured by the Thirteenth Amendment.  
There is a huge difference between a Republic in which all those born or 
naturalized are equal, and one in which all animals are equal but some are 
less equal than others.  The idea of legalized inequality has a logic that 
history forbids us to deny; it leads toward forced labor, deportation, and 
concentration camps.236  
To make legal equality, or even existence, dependent on blood has a 
chilling history worldwide.  To the extent that other countries follow the jus 
sanguinis rule today, it can‘t be said that their immigration policies are a 
thumping success either.  As Professor Shachar notes, ―strict interpretation 
of jus sanguinis perpetuates the exclusion of certain segments of the 
permanent population of a given polity by denying them full access to the 
rights and benefits of citizenship, based on the criterion of ancestry that 
they can neither choose nor change.‖237  According to Shachar, ―under such 
conditions, jus sanguinis constitutes a deeply objectionable system of 
legalized ascriptive hierarchy.‖238 
In the specific context of American history, if the children of ―illegal 
aliens‖ are ―illegal‖ themselves, then we have taken a giant step toward 
recreating slavery in all but name.  If citizenship is the hereditary gift of the 
nation rather than the inheritance of its people, we are drifting back toward 
the discredited doctrine of Dred Scott.  And if state governments arrogate 
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to themselves the power to decide which groups within their borders 
―merit‖ citizenship, the central promise of the Amendment—paramount 
national citizenship—has been eviscerated.  
The idea that these radical egalitarians ―intended‖ to allow creation of a 
new hereditary and subordinate caste of laborers should, I think, stir the 
profoundest skepticism.  That it is being taken seriously by prominent 
judges and academics is yet another melancholy illustration of Samuel 
Johnson‘s saying that ―reason by degrees submits to absurdity, as the eye is 
in time accommodated to darkness.‖239  Like courtiers‘ praise for the 
emperor‘s new clothes, the repeated claims to discern an obscure intent in 
clear language can create confusion; as only the good could see the non-
existent raiment, allegedly only the truly learned can see the invisible 
―intent‖ in the Clause.  
It should be the goal of scholarship to dispel, not deepen, conceptual 
darkness.  The work of many ―originalist‖ scholars has added significantly 
to our understanding of the Constitution‘s meaning and history.  One need 
not accept all the conclusions of an ―originalist‖ inquiry to feel grateful for 
the care and thoroughness with which it has been performed, and for the 
ideas and insights it has generated.  But not all originalism is careful.  The 
rhetoric of ―clear intent‖ may make it easy to substitute anachronistic, 
results-oriented ideas for a systematic interpretation of text, structure, and 
history—which are required of all constitutional scholars of any school.  A 
dubious claim of ―clear intent‖ may be followed by a claim that this 
―discovery‖ closes down the contemporary work of interpretation.  This 
rhetorical move disguises the fact that a contemporary interpretation is 
being imposed on constitutional text as surely as it might be by any radical 
―non-interpretivist.‖   
That the techniques and discourse of originalism can be misused to reach 
such a perverse result should give us some impetus to refine those 
techniques and sharpen that discourse. 
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